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THE OMEN: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe
AND THE FUTURE OF
TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
Russel Lawrence Barsh *
Although Congress' power in Indian affairs is said to be plenary'
and its policy and wisdom unreviewable,2 essential principles have
grown more out of the gaps than the substance in federal legisla-
tion. Familiar and portentous phrases such as "guardianship" and
"tribal sovereign immunity" are judicial constructions.3 Only one
federal statute addresses the general powers of tribes, and it simp-
ly incorporates by reference "all powers vested ... by existing
law,"i.e., federal common law.' Courts must often rely upon the
application of standardized presumptions to resolve the most
significant issues.'
Judicial interpretation and federal policy have developed more
or less independently and inconsistently in the past thirty years.
Congress appeared anxious to terminate reservations in the 'fifties,
but the Supreme Court interpreted national policy to require that
tribes retain certain inherent powers until actually expressly
limited by statute.6 In the 'sixties, Congress reversed its position on
termination. Recent legislation such as the Indian Civil Rights Act
7
and Indian Self-Determination Act' seem to recognize that tribes
are here to stay and serve important social and political functions.
Now the Court is weakening its earlier stand on tribes' inherent
sovereignty.
Judicial erosion of tribal sovereignty has not been deliberate.
The Court lacks direction. Opinions are internally contradictory,
inconsistent with one another, and often in conflict with political,
historical, and economic facts. While the Court searches for
guidance, tribal affairs are thrown into a dangerous state of uncer-
tainty and vulnerability. The most recent manifestation of this
process is Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe,' which promises to fur-
ther confuse the issues and will work serious economic hardships
on tribes. It can only be understood against the background of the
decisions that preceded it and the economic reality it
misconstrued.
*A.B. 1971, Harvard; J.D., Harvard. Assistant Professor of Business, Government,
and Society, University of Washington School of Business Administration. Member,
Washington State Bar.
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I. The Involution of a Legal Doctrine: The Infringement Test
A Checkered History
Lawyers often speak of legal doctrines as "evolving." This
evokes an image of adaptive improvement, and by analogy to
biological evolution, a gradual process from generalization to
specialization. Legal concepts do not always evolve in this sense.
When a court is satisfied with the ramifications of a new rule, it
entrenches it by means of selective extension to new cases:
specialization, evolution. However, a court repentant of an earlier
position and unwilling to repudiate the precedent openly may
choose to weaken it, not merely by narrowing its application, but
more importantly by ambiguating its application until it stands
for everything and nothing at the same time. This is what I call
"involution." The demise of the infringement test is an example of
legal involution.
Prior to Williams v. Lee,'° the Supreme Court avoided adoption
of a single, principled basis for testing the limits of state power
over tribal communities. Thee cornerstone of Indian law,
Worcester v. Georgia" has been read for a doctrine of federal
preemption of state law arising from the commerce, treaty, and
supremacy clauses of the Constitution. It did not include the
slightest hint that tribes were less sovereign than states within their
own boundaries. Indeed, the author of the Court's opinion in
Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall, had remarked in an earlier opi-
nion that a non-Indian purchasing land from a tribe within its
borders would be entirely subject to tribal law while residing
there. 2
From 1871 to 1934, the United States engaged in an aggressive
policy of intervention in tribes' domestic affairs. Tribal govern-
ments were subjected to supervision, religious activities were sup-
pressed, and children were coercively reeducated.'" The courts
could no longer without hypocrisy hold up Worcester as a source
of exclusive federal authority over tribal affairs. According to
Worcester, this authority arose from treaties, Le., voluntary ces-
sions of power from tribes to the United States." Because its coer-
cive actions on reservations were not supported by treaties and
were in fact often violently resisted, Congress needed some alter-
native theory of legitimacy.
The courts responded by reconceptualizing federal power as a
function of its purpose. Reservations were no longer sovereign
tribal homelands but schools for the civilization of the Indians."
Reservation programs putatively intended for the benefit of In-
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dians were accordingly declared immune from state interference
on a theory of federal preemption.'6 Worcester continued to be
read for the principle that, as between the United States and the in-
dividual states, only the former had authority to dispose of In-
dians and their territory; but tribal consent was no longer to be a
limitation on that authority. 7
The federal purpose idea necessarily implied strict adherence to
express congressional policy. Courts began to make references to
Congress' "plenary power" over Indians, which they construed to
mean extraordinary congressional discretion to make policy and
lack of judicial authority to review it." This did not exclude occa-
sional judicial acquiescence in arrogation of power by the states to
address problems not yet spoken to by federal law.
Such was the case in United States v. McBratney'9 and United
States v. Draper,' decided while Congress was in the process of
subdividing and abolishing many northwestern reservations.
These two cases would play a peculiar role in the development of
federal Indian law in the Warren Court. McBratney held that the
courts of Colorado could entertain the prosecution of a non-
Indian for the murder off another non-Indian within the boun-
daries of the Ute Reservation. The Court was impressed by the
absence of a provision for "absolute [federal] jurisdiction and con-
trol" of Indian lands in Colorado's Enabling Act. "Whenever,
upon the admission of a State into the Union, Congress has in-
tended to except out of it an Indian reservation, or the sole and ex-
clusive jurisdiction over that reservation, it has done so by express
words."2' The converse of McBratney is that states with such
language in their enabling acts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians' reservation activities. The "rule" was nothing more than a
standardized, gap-filling presumption in favor of continued
federal preemption.
Montana's Enabling Act included an "absolute jurisdiction and
control" clause.22 However, the subsequent General Allotment Act
contemplated, as the Draper Court understood it, ultimate ter-
mination of all tribes.' This diffuse policy, the Court reasoned,
superseded the express language of the Enabling Act. Once a reser-
vation had actually been allotted, Congress retained under the
"absolute jurisdiction and control clause" only those powers
"essential to prevent any implication of the power of the State to
frustrate the limitation imposed by the laws of the United States
upon the title of lands once in an Indian reservation, but which
had become extinct by allotment in severalty."2 Under allotment,
all reservation lands would ultimately be merged into state
jurisdiction, hence, the states might reasonably enjoy some
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measure of control during the transition. In a word, Draper
reversed the presumption in McBratney. State power is to be
presumed absent express federal language to the contrary.
The end of allotment in 1934 rendered Draper obsolete. It ap-
plied to a special set of facts that no longer existed. Moreover, the
Indian Reorganization Act' recognized tribes as functioning
political bodies, rebutting the contrary implication of prior laws.
Nevertheless, the ramifications of reorganization have not, even
at this time, been fully clarified. The proliferation of federally
supervised tribal governments under the Act actually resulted in
surprisingly little litigation for almost twenty-five years. Although
lower federal courts had occasion from time to time to interpret
the status of tribes,26 the Supreme Court did not address that
enigma directly until 1958.
When the Court did intervene, Congress was several years into
its new policy of "termination." 27 Like allotment, termination con-
templated ultimate absorption of tribes by the states. However,
allotment involved a 25-year transitional process of subdivision,
interpenetration by non-Indian landowners, and gradual phasing-
out of federal supervision, in the kind of power vacuum that led
Montana to assert jurisdiction in Draper. Termination was by
contrast like the flicking off of a switch. Within a year to two
years, the tribe and its property were relinquished to state control.
The state either had control or it did not.' Termination was,
moreover, originally intended by Congress to depend upon tribal
consent. The absence of a provision for tribal consent in the law as
passed prompted criticism from the President, opposition by
tribes, and eventual amendment by Congress in 1968. '9
T4e "Infringement Test" is Born
In Williams v. Lee"° the Court frankly sought to synthesize the
shifting and inconstant tide of Indian law, giving shape to the first
general principle of tribal jurisdiction and powers to emerge since
John Marshall's time. The dispute was between a non-Indian
creditor doing business on the Navajo Reservation and his Navajo
debtors, who resisted a state civil action for recovery of the debt.
The Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that the states' power over
reservations is limited only by Congress' express statutory
prohibitions.' This amounted to a presumption in favor of the
legitimacy of state power.
Writing for the Court, Justice Black concluded that "Congress
has.., acted consistently upon the assumption that the States
have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation,"
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citing the Indian Reorganization Act and Trade and Intercourse
Act" as examples of congressional provision for exclusively
federal and tribal regulation. Black interpreted termination legisla-
tion as evidence that "when Congress has wished the States to ex-
ercise this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction."3
He also observed that the Navajos entered into a treaty with the
United States in 1868 and that "[i]mplicit in these treaty
terms... was the understanding that the internal affairs of the In-
dians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever
tribal government existed. " 31 President Truman'had vetoed a bill
to extend state jurisdiction over the Navajos in 1949,"+ and the
tribal government had received substantial assistance from Con-
gress to expand its activities.
At the same time, Black was not prepared to fashion any rule
potentially inconsistent with continuing federal intervention in the
Navajos' affairs. He conceded that Congress had power to subject
the Navajos to state jurisdiction against their will.' Nor did he im-
agine Congress' long-range policy for tribes to be anything less
than completely assimilationist.
Congress has followed a policy calculated eventually to make
all Indians full-fledged participants in American society. This
policy contemplates criminal and civil jurisdiction over In-
dians by any State ready to assume the burdens that go with
it as soon as the educational and economic status of the In-
dians permits the change without disadvantage to them.3
Thus the goal was to dissolve tribal governments, but only when
the Indians were deemed adequately prepared for the respon-
sibilities of state citizenship and prosperous enough to prevent
economic hardship to the states. The Court merely believed it to
be Congress' intention that it have exclusive control over this tran-
saction.
Black deftly rationalized the apparent inconsistencies among the
Court's prior decisions. Discussing the Worcester rule of exclusive
tribal sovereignty subject only to treaties with the United States,
he argued that "[olver the years this Court has modified these
principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involv-
ed and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized .... 
as in according Indians the right to bring suit in state courts.
However, this right goes to the states' lack of power to
discriminate upon the basis of race, not their power to act
extraterritorially." In support of his theory, Black also invoked
nineteenth-century decisions such as Draper that actually relied
on federal delegations of power to states under defunct laws."0
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Black's citations were inaccurate, inapplicable, or
misconstrued. His oft-quoted rule that, "absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them,"' was his own invention, albeit more
or less consistent with the results of prior federal decisions. It had
never before appeared as the rule of a case. In fact, Black himself
had stated the opposite rule in dictum twelve years earlier in New
York ex rel. Ray v. Martin. "
Jurisdictional disputes between tribes and states go to the nature
of the reservation boundary line. States always argued that the
boundary was nothing more than a demarcation of Indian owner-
ship; tribes accorded it deep political significance. Rather than
resolve this controversy one way or the other, Black's infringe-
ment test waffled, declaring the boundary political for some pur-
poses, merely proprietary for others. It therefore implied a certain
theory of the origin and purpose of reservations. Black apparently
as;sumed that tribal lands are not reservations of original sovereign
territory but were acquired from and remain a "part" of the
states.3
"Infringement" characterizes tribal jurisdiction as governed by
subject matter, not territory. Territory is a difficult enough rule to
apply in resolving multi-state jurisdictional conflicts in a mobile
society. Without precise enumeration, subject matter is even more
difficult to apply. Anything that a state does, on or off a reserva-
tion, will affect that reservation to a greater or lesser extent. The
state and reservation economies are inextricably linked, and there
is considerable transiency across their common border. State ac-
tion will always present problems of degree rather than kind.
The infringement test is internally inconsistent and politically
paradoxical. When it authorizes a state action, is the Court really
saying it will have no adverse impact upon the tribe? Why, then,
did the tribe complain in the first place? Barring some extraor-
dinary ignorance on the part of the adversaries, the theory of the
remedy is completely at war with the very existence of a dispute.
A court cannot please everyone by means of the cute fiction that it
will uphold that party whose claim is not adverse to the other's.
The states have always maintained the importance of ter-
ritoriality. No state would accept the power of others to govern its
citizens wherever they should go, least of all the sister states of the
Atlantic megalopolis whose work-week populations consist
substantially of out-of-staters. The ability of a state to maintain a
uniform set of environmental conditions, risks, and opportunities
consistent with its public policy declines in proportion to the
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number of persons and value of property within its territory that it
cannot fully control. All of the states must operate under the aegis
of uniform concurrent federal laws, but requiring them to accept
concurrency with forty-nine other states as well would be con-
sidered provocative in the extreme.
The states would therefore consider a change from territorial to
subject matter jurisdiction a loss of sovereignty, yet they main-
tain, and the Court agrees, that such a change has no adverse ef-
fect on tribes. There are only two ways to reconcile this apparent
contradiction in principle. It might be advanced that the loss of
sovereignty involved is de minimis for tribes because they, unlike
states, have in the past exercised relatively little control over their
territory, and little or none over non-Indian residents. This,
however, ignores the possibility that tribes may have reason to in-
crease their control in the future; many have already begun to do
so. If Williams is to be read as a kind of tribal preemption rule,
then, by analogy with the general federal preemption rule, tribal
inaction does not necessarily authorize state action, and state ac-
tion to fill a void is ousted by subsequent tribal legislation.
It might also be argued that tribes lacked territorial jurisdiction
originally, and are mere associations of individuals, so that they
have lost nothing. Johnson v. M'Intosh held that tribes do not
have title to the soil, but merely a kind of possession, title being in
the United States or the states." However, this was simply a fiction
of convenience to dispose of conflicting federal patents and tribal
land grants and preserve the monopoly of the federal Land Office.
Worcester unambiguously contemplated territorial jurisdiction
and was decided by the same bench a decade later.
There remains, finally, the enigma of that phrase, "[aibsent
governing Acts of Congress." How specific must an act be to be
"governing?" Was Williams itself a case of "infringement," or was
it "governed" by the Navajo Treaty, Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation
Act, and other general federal laws Black discussed at length? As
none of Black's citations specifically recognize a power in the
Navajo Tribe to exercise exclusive civil jurisdiction over members,
one of two conclusions must be drawn. Either they are immaterial
to the case, or else Black had in mind that these general laws
preempt state jurisdiction generally. If the Navajo-Hopi
Rehabilitation Act, which only recognizes that tribe's exercise of
powers vested "by existing law," is sufficiently "governing" to
cover a non-Indian's action for an Indian's debt, then the Indian
Reorganization Act must be at least equally "governing" of the
nearly two hundred tribes it covers. I.R.A. also refers to tribal
powers vested "by existing law" without further specification.
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Following Williams, it must have been anticipated that the
Court would move swiftly and decisively to give definite shape
and texture to its new doctrine, lest it actually result in ag-
gravating the uncertainties left by prior law. On the contrary, the
Court did not use the infringement test for fifteen years. In the
meantime it followed an odyssey through various alternative and
inconsistent rules, always citing Williams as if it somehow provid-
ed a common conceptual thread. The Court became increasingly
preoccupied with the background details of each case without
relating them back to general principles.
The Alaskan Connection: "Infringement" Exalted
In 1962 the companion cases of Metlakatla Indian Community
i'. Egan's and Kake v. Egan 6 posed some new historical and
political problems. The Court responded with confusion, and the
involution of the infringement test began. Metlakatla and Kake
both involved attempts by the state of Alaska to prevent the use of
fish traps by Alaskan natives. Natives had always used traps,
which are, for anadromous fish stocks, the most efficient harvest
technology and afford the trapper considerable cost advantages in
the wholesale market. Unfortunately, marine fishermen have
often prevailed upon state legislatures to prohibit trapping as a
conservation measure, the underlying motivation being to
eliminate the trappers' ability to undersell marine fishermen to fish
processors."
The Annette Islands Reserve was established by an act of Con-
gress. In 1916, it was extended three thousand feet to sea by
presidential proclamation in connection with a federally spon-
sored tribal cannery development. '9 Both the Act and proclama-
tion expressly authorized federal regulation of the fishery. The
Secretary of the Interior authorized the Metlakatlans to operate
fish traps within the reserve, and trapping continued to be
authorized after passage of the Alaska Anti-Fish Trap Conserva-
tion Law in 1959, notwithstanding state threats to enforce the law
against the natives." Metlakatla brought suit for an injunction
against state interference with its traps, raising as alternative
grounds for decision lack of state jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tions and lack of state power over federal instrumentalities.
Although he took pains to distinguish Alaskans generally from
other native Americans," Justice Frankfurter described Metlakatla
as uniquely similar to reservations in the lower 48 states.5 '2 The Act
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creating the Annette Islands Reserve, he pointed out, specified
that the Metlakatlans were to use and enjoy it subject to federa
regulations, and to form a tribal government under federal
supervision.' He found no evidence that either Congress or the Ex-
ecutive had ever departed from the original policy of preserving
an exclusively tribal and preemptively federally regulated fishery
in the Annette Islands, and noted that subsequent general laws
such as the Alaska Statehood Act expressly reserved "absolute"
federal control of prior statutory native fishing rights."4
Frankfurter could find only one flaw. The Secretary of the Interior
issued the Metlakatla fishing regulations under the authority of
the Alaska Statehood Act, not the Act and proclamation creating
the Annette Islands Reserve. Accordingly, the case was remanded
with the expectation that the Secretary would issue the same or
new regulations citing the proper authority.'
Judging from his discussion of the federal legislative record,
Frankfurter had no doubts that the Metlakatlans were entitled to
their traps purely as a matter of statutory construction. At no
point did he rely on infringement or consider what law might
apply "absent governing Acts of Congress."
Kake was a challenge to the same Alaska Anti-Fish Trap Con-
servation Law brought by the Organized Village of Kake and the
Angoon Community Association, both I.R.A. tribes.56 Like
Metlakatla, both were dependent upon salmon fishing, tradi-
tionally fished with traps, and had received federal assistance to
build canneries some time before Alaska became a state. Unlike
Metlakatla, neither occupied a federal reservation. The traps were
operated in the Tongass National Forest and were originally
authorized by the Forest Service and Army Corps of Engineers. In
1959, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations for the licens-
ing of these traps purportedly under authority of the Alaska
Statehood Act.
The Secretary had no specific statutory authority to issue these
regulations, as he had under the 1891 Act in the case of
Metlakatla," and Frankfurter read the general language of the
Statehood Act, reserving to the United States "absolute jurisdic-
tion and control" of Indian fishing, to "not give powers of the
nature claimed" by the Secretary.- Based entirely on a few
statements made during the House hearings on Alaskan
statehood, he concluded that the Statehood Act merely
"preserve[d] the status quo" pending some future and final deter-
mination of native claims. 9 "The disclaimer was intended to
preserve unimpaired the right of any Indian claimant to assert his
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claim.., against the Government," and nothing more.' If this
were the case, why didn't Congress simply say so, instead of refer-
ring to "jurisdiction and control?"
Frankfurter admitted that the "absolute jurisdiction and con-
trol" language of the Act received little attention in Congress.""
There was strong opposition in the Senate to any provision
depriving Alaska of police power over Alaskan native areas." The
obvious expedient would have been to adopt language in the Act
different from the acts already adopted for the lower 48 states.
The Senate's bill accordingly deleted the "jurisdiction" provision,
but the House bill retained it. In conference, the House text was
adopted, with one opposition senator (Jackson) expressing himself
reasonably confident that the two bills would have the identical
effect.
Frankfurter's use of this history asks us to accept two peculiar
principles of interpreting legislative history: that a political vic-
tory should be construed against the successful party, and that a
single senator's legal interpretation of an act is representative of
the intent of Congress as a whole. The texts of the House and
Senate bills differed sufficiently to force the matter into con-
ference. This time-consuming process is not undertaken lightly by
Congress; it cannot be concluded from the adoption of the House
text that a majority of Congress was indifferent between the two
bills, only that opposition to the House text was weaker than op-
position to the Senate text.
Ten statehood acts, including Arizona's, included similar
languagei' If "absolute jurisdiction and control" preempted all
state jurisdiction, then why, Frankfurter asked, had the Court not
so construed Arizona's Enabling Act in Williams v. Lee? Instead
of depriving Arizona of jurisdiction outright, he reasoned, the
Court had proceeded by balancing the assertion of state power
against its impact on tribal self-government, indicating that 'ab-
solute' federal jurisdiction is not invariably exclusive
jurisdiction."" It is unnecessary to criticize this as semantic
nonsense. The Arizona Enabling Act was never an issue in
Williams. ,
Frankfurter attributed his rule to Draper which, as we have
seen, construed Montana's Enabling Act in the context of the allot-
ment policy. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act repudiated
allotment-a fact of which Frankfurter was fully
aware'-rendering Draper obsolete. Moreover, Alaskan reserva-
tions were never subject to allotment.
Frankfurter argued that it was Congress' policy to increase state
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power over tribes, citing Sections 231 and 452 of Title 25 of the
United States Code. He described Section 231 as authorizing state
officers to enforce sanitation, health, and compulsory education
laws within reservations." In fact, the state must first obtain tribal
consent, if the tribe has a governing body." Similarly, Section 452
merely authorizes the Secretary of the Interior "in his discretion"
to contract with the states to administer federally funded Indian
programs; it confers no police powers on them.9
Frankfurter's trump, however, was termination, still in its hey-
day. These laws, he suggested, recreated the transitional situation
of Draper and required a presumption against broad tribal
powers. Frankfurter conveniently neglected to quote Section 2(b)
of Public Law 280, which states that "[niothing in this section
[conferring criminal jurisdiction on the named states]
shall.., deprive any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or community
of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal Trea-
ty, agreement, or statute with respect to... fishing or the control,
licensing, or regulation thereof."' Instead he paraphrased it as
"disclaim[ing] the intention to permit States to interfere with
federally granted fishing privileges,"" which is quite another mat-
ter. The law itself unambiguously establishes exclusive federal
jurisdiction of previously recognized fisheries. Frankfurter's
paraphrasing of it implies that the state may regulate these
fisheries if in so doing it does not "interfere" with them, which is a
relative judgment. Evidently he hoped to square his interpretation
of the statutes with the infringement test, missing the point that in-
fringement applies only governing Acts "absent of Congress."72
Even if infringement were the proper standard, Frankfurter's
analysis left much to be desired. Without facts or precedent, he
asserted that "state regulation of off-reservation fishing certainly
does not impinge on treaty-protected reservation self-government,
the factor found decisive in Williams v. Lee. " But the tribe and its
government were supported by the traps, and the kind of gear us-
ed in harvesting salmon necessarily determines the size and unit
cost of the harvest. Any limitation on gear choice must affect the
realizable value of the fishery. A prohibition against trapping, the
most efficient technology, reduces resource value as surely as a
direct tax or confiscation. Of course, state regulation also ousts
the power of the tribe to adopt inconsistent regulations, a direct
infringement of tribal self-government.74
Frankfurter gave the statutory context only passing mention. '
The main thrust of his opinion was different: even if the saving
clauses in the Statehood Act and Public Law 280 did apply to
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Kake and Angoon, they did not mean what they said because
there was no infringement.
This implied a rule, entirely unnecessary to dispose of the case,
that infringement limits the meaning of express federal legislation.
Is the Court competent to modify acts of Congress in accordance
with its own sense of policy? Infringement began as a gap-filling
rule where Congress had not spoken, giving the benefit of the
doubt to tribes consistent with what the Court conceived to be
overall federal policy. In Kake infringement became a standard of
policy superior even to Congress, taking away rights already ex-
pressly granted to tribes.76
.Justice Black Again at the Helm: Infringement A voided
With the case of Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax
Commission,"' stewardship of the Court's conceptualization of
-ribalstatus returned to Justice Black, author of Williams. The ap-
pellant sought immunity from an Arizona gross income tax on the
alternative grounds of preemptive federal regulation of licensed
traders on the Navajo Reservation, and preemptive federal regula-
tion of commerce with Indian tribes generally. The real
significance of the case is diminished considerably by the fact that
the Court limited itself to the narrower of these two arguments,
refusing to consider the jurisdictional status of businesses as a
whole located within tribal territories."8
Observing, as he had in Williams, that "from the very first days
of our Government, the Federal Government had been permitting
the Indians largely to govern themselves, free from state
interference,"7 Black remarked on the degree to which Congress
had nonetheless exercised control over the activities of non-
Indians entering tribal areas for the purpose of trade." Special
regulations had been adopted by the Department of the Interior
for licensing traders to the Navajo, Hopi, and Zuni."' "These ap-
parently all-inclusive regulations... would seem in themselves
sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of Indian
trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for
state laws imposing additional burdens on traders.""
This narrow ruling, entirely consistent with the main body of
law on federal preemption under the commerce clause, "  would
have adequately disposed of the case. Black nevertheless opined
on the purpose of the federal preemption of Indian trading."4
[here was, he concluded, an "evident congressional purpose of
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ensuring that no burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders for
trading with Indians on reservations.., in order to protect Indians
against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian
Commissioner."" He also considered it relevant that "federal
legislation has left the State with no duties or responsibilities
respecting the reservation Indians,"' implying that the equities lay
against any state power to tax reservation wealth.
Warren left a great deal unsaid. Was the tax invalid because the
regulation of Indian traders generally had been preempted by
Congress, or only because the effect would have been to increase
prices paid by Indian consumers? Black carefully avoided answer-
ing this question by limiting his discussion to taxes on sales made
to Indians. Under a narrow purpose rule, taxes on sales to non-
Indians would have to be upheld. Under a more general preemp-
tion rule applying subject matter criteria, the tax on non-Indians
would be invalid. Black's opinion also left open the possibility that
states' contribution to Indians' welfare would be considered an
equity in favor of state taxation, when and if the states provided
services to reservations.
A Court Divided: Infringement Distinguished
Black avoided discussion of infringement as such in Warren. He
neither rebuffed nor endorsed Frankfurter's expansive interpreta-
tion of that rule in Kake. Tribes' residual powers were simply not
in issue. In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,7 Justice
Marshall revived infringement only to completely confuse its
source and meaning.
From the outset Marshall characterized Indians as "residents
within the borders" of the states, implying that tribal sovereignty
is an exception to a presumption in favor of state power. "This
case requires us once again to reconcile the plenary power of the
States over residents within their borders with the semi-
autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations."" But
this depends upon our definition of state territory. If perchance a
state had been created within the exterior boundaries of another
state, could the greater state assert plenary power over the
smaller? The distinction between exterior boundaries and territory
has no place in interstate disputes only because no state encloses
another. Reservations, however, do pose this problem. Reference
merely to the more-inclusive boundary results in absurdity. If the
Yakima Reservation, which is entirely within the exterior boun-
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daries of Washington, is part of Washington State territory, then
the parcels of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah enclosed by the
Navajo Tribe's exterior boundaries must be a part of that tribe's
territory.
It is significant that the plaintiff in this case conceded she was a
resident of Arizona. 9 The Court was not, therefore, called upon to
determine whether a reservation is a part of the corpus of a sur-
rounding state, but only whether a reservation that is admitted to
be part of a state may nevertheless enjoy exceptions to that state's
plenary power. This is similar to the position taken by Justice
Frankfurter in Kake but, ironically, Marshall described Kake as
applicable only to Alaskan communities not "possessfing] the
usual accoutrements of tribal self-government.""
The Court was finally in a position to reconcile Williams, Kake,
and Warren. Unfortunately, Marshall confused the situation fur-
ther by reading Warren as a tribal sovereignty case9' rather than as
a federal preemption case.92 Williams and Warren refer to in-
fringement of tribal or federal government, respectively. In
MlcClanahan the tax was on individual income. Rather than draw
the economically appropriate conclusion that a tax on individuals
within a government's jurisdiction potentially impairs that
government's ability to raise its own taxes, Marshall re-read
Warren as a case dealing with state power to regulate private
reservation activities generally.93 Of course, the trading post in
Warren was a private activity, but it was also an exclusively
federally regulated private activity. The determinative fact was
the status of the regulator, not the status of the regulated object.
The confusion deepened as Marshall proceeded to cite
nineteenth-century cases authorizing state regulation of non-
Indians within reservations.9' If these cases remain valid, a tribe's
powers cannot be territorial and sovereign, but only personal, like
that of a private association. Although no treaties or statutes of
the United States expressly forbid tribes to exercise complete ter-
ritorial powers, during the allotment period courts assumed the
purpose of reservations was to swiftly advance the Indians'
civilization. Therefore, the existence of a reservation could have
no bearing on nonIndians unless their activities interfered with the
Indians' progress. Similarly, some courts reasoned that self-
supporting, off-reservation Indians lost their protected status
because they had transcended the need for federal supervision, not
because they had physically left the tribe's territory." But this line
of reasoning should have dissipated when Congress recognized
tribal self-government in 1934. It should certainly have been re-
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jected by Marshall in 1973, five years after Congress repudiated its
"termination" policy.
Marshall seemed to have difficulty keeping his theories straight.
At one point he argued that the principle of residual tribal
sovereignty retains vitality in the law. "[I1t would vastly over-
simplify the problem to say that nothing remains of the notion
that reservation Indians are a separate people to whom state
jurisdiction, and therefore state tax legislation, may not extend. '98
Later, he argued that "the trend has been away from the idea of in-
herent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward
reliance on federal preemption," characterizing the history of
tribal self-government as a mere "backdrop": "The modern cases
thus tend to avoid reliance on Platonic notions of Indian
sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and
statutes which define the limits of state power." 7 Nor was Mar-
shall denying the existence of the "infringement test" so much as
he was suggesting that it applied to increasingly fewer cases. "The
question [of residual tribal sovereignty] is generally of little more
than theoretical importance, however, since in almost all cases,
federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries of federal and
state jurisdiction.""3
Were the remaining gaps in legislation really so few and nar-
row? There was neither congressional authorization of state taxa-
tion, nor express congressional immunization of Indian income
from taxation, in McClanahan itself. The infringement test could
have been applied. Instead, Marshall proceeded to resurrect the
rule of Carpenter v. Shaw, a pre-Indian Reorganization Act case,
that "[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the
weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation,
dependent upon its protection and good faith."" He proposed that
in the absence of specific federal laws, Carpenter requires a
presumption in the tribe's favor.'0 He declined to discuss whether
Arizona's tax infringed upon Navajo self-government.
Black's statement of the infringement test in Williams used the
words, "infring[e] upon the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws.'... But Williams did not involve direct interference
with a tribe. There was no showing in that case that the Navajo
Tribe had laws for the collection of debts, courts to apply them, or
jurisdiction of both the parties. There was no evidence that
Arizona debtor law conflicted with any specific Navajo or-
dinances. The case can only be understood as denying the power
of a state to preempt a tribe's legislative jurisdiction, its power to
make laws, not the specific laws it may have already made.
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Marshall could have argued that Arizona's income tax sub-
tracted from the Navajo Tribe's tax base, limiting the tribe's
potential tax yield, and redistributing the Indians' income without
regard to tribal policy. It would be irrelevant whether the tribe
itself levied a tax, as it had power to tax and might tax at some
future time. Moreover, not taxing is as much a matter of public
policy as taxing, as the myriad exemptions in the federal tax
system illustrate.
Marshall failed, however, to reconcile Williams and
McClanahan. Instead, he concluded by distinguishing them. "To
be sure, when Congress has legislated on Indian matters, it has,
most often, dealt with the tribes as collective entities. But those en-
tities are, after all, composed of individual Indians, and the
legislation confers individual rights."'"2 Arizona's tax infringed
upon Rosalind McClanahan's "rights as a reservation Indian," not
the political rights of her tribe. This innovation, unsupported by
any citation, should have sent a shock wave through Indian law
circles. Its significance is devastating. By this reasoning, the race,
not the residence of the taxpayer, may be the determinative factor.
Marshall seemed to be groping for a two-tiered test that both in-
corporated and distinguished infringement, arguing that Williams
and cases like it "have dealt principally with situations involving
non-Indians" in which both the state and tribe have an interest."
By implication, if the state has an interest in the controversy, the
Court will be more amenable to upholding state jurisdiction."0
Elsewhere in his opinion, as we have seen, Marshall appeared to
think that Williams applied to interference with tribes, Carpenter
to interference with individuals. In addition, his opening remarks
regarding Indians being residents of the state implied the opposite
of Carpenter, Le., that states may penetrate reservations unless
Congress expressly forbids it. Evidently he had no clear picture of
the applicable law and was experimenting with possible solutions.
The Court's reasoning in the companion case, Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones," is instructive of its lack of real commitment to
any principle. Mescalero involved state taxation of a tribally own-
ed business located off the reservation.
Unlike McClanahan, Williams, and Warren, Mescalero divided
the Court. Justice White wrote for the majority, with Brennan,
Stewart, and Douglas dissenting. Justice Marshall, author of the
accompanying McClanahan opinion, was surprisingly silent. Ob-
viously the Court was confused, as the lack of structure in
McClanahan suggested notwithstanding its unanimity.
Mescalero has been sometimes erroneously read for a distinc-
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tion between on-reservation and off-reservation tribal trust lands.
Federal law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire
lands "in trust" for tribes'" and to extend reservation boundaries.107
In fact, the land at issue in Mescalero was merely leased by the
tribe from the United States Forest Service." It was neither trust
nor reservation land. Justice White summarily rejected the tribe's
claim that its activities were those of a federal instrumentality sub-
ject to exclusive, preemptive federal control wherever they are
conducted. He did not actually arrive at this conclusion by argu-
ment, but simply repeated Marshall's observation in McClanahan
that questions of Indian law require "individualized treatment of
particular treaties and specific federal statutes."" He, too, hid
behind the fiction of statutory interpretation in a case in which
there were no relevant statutes, declining to provide any principl-
ed basis for his decision.
White criticized the "theory... that a federal instrumentality
was involved and that the tax would interfere with the Govern-
ment's realizing the maximum return for its wards" as a historical
relic of little remaining significance."' He produced little if any
sound authority for this generalization, citing two Oklahoma and
one Wyoming tax decisions Justice Marshall distinguished the
same day in McClanahan as inapplicable to communities which
"possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government.'"" For
some reason he also thought it important that individual Indians
become subject to state law when they leave the reservation;"2 but
the fact that a state's citizens become subject to other states' laws
when they travel abroad is entirely consistent with the complete
territorial sovereignty of each state.
I have no quarrel, however, with the result. The federal in-
strumentality idea is hostile to tribal self-government because it
limits lawful tribal activities to those that serve federal objectives.
There is no reason why tribes should strive to have more
extraterritorial sovereignty than the states enjoy, if it means ad-
vancing a theory inconsistent with tribes' enjoyment of as much
domestic authority as the states.
The result is also consistent with general constitutional tax law.
As White observed, quoting from one of the Court's earlier deci-
sions, the "mere fact that property is used, among others, by the
United States as an instrument for effecting its purpose does not
relieve it from state taxation.". Early in this century the Court
began to appreciate Thomas Jefferson's fear that house-that-Jack-
built arguments would be used to extend federal power indefinite-
ly. "Theoretically," the Court remarked in Group No. 1 Oil Corp.
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v, Bass, a case involving sales of government lands, "any tax im-
posed on the buyer with respect to the purchased property may
have some effect on the price, and thus remotely and indirectly af-
fect the selling government," but this should not extend an in-
tergovernmental immunity through the entire chain of
distribution."' Increasingly, federal courts in non-Indian tax cases
have limited intergovernmental immunities to the activities of
public agencies themselves."'
Justice White advanced the legislative history of the Indian
Reorganization Act as evidence of Congress' intent to free, rather
than further entangle tribes in the federal bureaucracy."' Recogni-
tion of tribal governments as politically distinct from the Bureau
of Indian Affairs was one argument advanced in the Act's favor by
the Bureau itself."7 However, even if Congress did not intend
tribes to stand in the shoes of the United States vis-a-vis the states,
we are no farther along in the search for some other principle
determinative of the tribe-state boundary.
White's blanket dismissal of the instrumentality idea is never-
theless hard to square with the facts. In Warren, Justice Black
argued from the existence of numerous statutes and regulations
governing the activities of reservation traders that Congress had
preempted the field. Far more statutes and regulations govern the
activities of tribal governments. In fact, most of the applicable ti-
tle of the Code of Federal Regulations deals with tribal use of pro-
perty, the activity being taxed in Mescalero. "' Everything relating
to licensed traders falls within a subpart of a subchapter."
Any reasonable view of the circumstances leads to the conclu-
sion that tribally owned business enterprises are more heavily
regulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs than licensed traders.
Tribes must obtain approval for leasing and contracting, and for
the expenditure of the profits; the traders in Warren merely had to
obtain a discretionary license and avoid selling certain articles
such as liquor on their premises. In fact, the Tenth Circuit had
already ruled that federal supervision of tribal business activities
constitutes "major federal action" within the meaning of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act.'2'
The entire discussion of tribes' general intergovernmental im-
munities was, however, pure dictum. White accepted the United
States' argument, amicus curiae, that the formality of taking the
lease in trust for the tribe would have been "meaningless" because
the United States already owned the land. Is any lease of federal
land to a tribe therefore automatically trust land, even if the
Secretary of the Interior never processes it in accordance with the
applicable statute?'2'
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/2
Trust "land" is expressly exempted from state taxation by
statute.2" The New Mexico taxes complained of were levied on in-
come and the use of personalty. Accordingly, Justice White turned
to the question of whether a tax on income earned on a tract of
land is a tax on the land itself.
A state resident's out-of-state realty cannot ordinarily be taxed
by his state, but his income, including income earned on or pro-
ceeds from his out-of-state realty, can be taxed.'" This rule avoids
extra-territorial tax sales in violation of the much esteemed ex-
clusive authority of each state over its own territory, without
significantly impairing the power of each state to tax its own
citizens' wealth whereever deposited.
The Supreme Court had previously upheld federal taxation of
Indians' incomes, including the proceeds of trust lands. Oil
royalties"4 and per capita shares in mineral development's on trust
lands, individual and tribal, are subject to federal income taxa-
tion. However, capital gains taxes do not apply to liquidation of
timber on trust land on the principle that to do so would amount
to a tax on the value of the land itself."' It comes too close to
federal taxation of a federally protected right, Le., a conflict
between Indian policy and revenue policy. Justice White conclud-
ed that in the absence of language to the contrary in any federal
statute, it should be presumed that income earned on trust land
does not share the immunity of land itself.
There are several serious difficulties with this reasoning. The ex-
istence of a power in the United States does not imply the existence
of an identical power in the states. There is a certain paradox in
any rule that permits the United States to tax its own "wards"
more extensively than the states can. On the other hand, there is a
certain rationality to federal preemption of taxation to preserve
the "guardian's" discretion over how and when Indians will be
taxed because taxes do affect behavior.U
7
A consideration of the economics of taxation should engender
some additional skepticism. An ad valorem tax such as an income,
use, or property tax, is engineered on a "deepest pocket" principle.
The eternal quandary in ad valorem taxation is determining which
citizens are actually the wealthiest. The Constitutional Conven-
tion debated for days in 1786 over whether land, personalty, ex-
penditures, or general income was the best measure of a man's
wealth." Every tax reform proposal meets similar criticism. It has
always rested within the sovereign discretion of the state
legislatures to resolve this for their own purposes, but when a
federal program is at stake, it may be necessary to review state tax
policy independently.
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In the context of deepest-pocket economics, the question of
policy is whether the value of the land (in the capital gains sense)
or the annual income accruing on it (or cash flow) best estimates
the ability of the owner to pay the tax. In many states, certain pro-
perty tax exemptions are justified in that the elderly may have ac-
cumulated valuable estates, but actually earn little income.
Elsewhere, property taxes are justified to the exclusion of income
taxes on the theory that the wealthier invest in land and enjoy
capital gains, so that an income tax falls heaviest on wage-earners.
In any event, the wealth of the owner is not exempt at all. The
level or degree of the tax, however, may be greater or smaller
depending upon what manifestations of wealth are evaluated for
tax purposes.
The tax exemption applicable to trust lands embodies an entire-
ly different theory, Le., to subsidize economic development
through tax immunization, rather than to raise revenue. A tax on
the proceeds of land depresses the income and savings rate of the
owner/operator as surely as a tax on the value of the land itself.
An income tax tends to chill development just as much as a simple
ad valorem property tax, based upon current rather than
developable value. If Congress in 1934 had contemplated the
possibility of future state income taxes, it might have been more
explicit about income taxation in the economic development pro-
visions of the Indian Reorganization Act. 29
In Squire v. Capoeman,"' the Court immunized trust allotment
proceeds from federal capital gains taxation, reasoning that
because the sale of timber from the land was its principal develop-
rnent value, taxation of timber sales would effectively take back
the only thing the United States had given the allottee to develop.
Of course, federal taxation of the seller's income has the same ef-
fect to a greater or lesser extent; it is merely computed on a dif-
ferent basis and at a different rate. If the Court in Squire had been
truly concerned about maximizing the value of the allotment, it
should have treated sales and income taxes identically."'
Douglas' dissent argued that the same rules of taxability should
govern both on and off-reservation enterprises. "There is no magic
in the word 'reservation.""32 In support, he cited a number of cases
holding that the federal government has power to enforce Indian
protective legislation off-reservation, on trust land, and indeed
even on state lands.'M
The majority did not suggest, however, that any such distinc-
tion exists as far as tax immunity is concerned; it read the relevant
federal statute to be equally applicable to on and off-reservation
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lands.' If anything, Justice White's failure to make such a distinc-
tion was his greatest error. In so doing, he left open the possibility
of construing Mescalero to afford businesses no greater immunity
from state regulation within the territory and jurisdiction of a
tribal government than the tribe itself enjoys outside of its ter-
ritory.
More than their immediate tax consequences, McClanahan and
Mescalero agreed that each tribe-state relationship is to be deter-
mined as an independent question of fact. If there are no general
"platonic" notions of tribal sovereignty, but merely the applicable
treaties and statutes, the way is opened for distinguishing the
status of each of some two hundred tribes. The legal costs and
uncertainties necessarily resulting from the adoption of that rule
necessarily chill reservation development.
The Blue Bull Bar and the Reservation That Isn't: Territoriality
Appears and Just as Surely Vanishes
What had happened to infringement, preemption, and the rule
of Carpenter v. Shaw? the dissent asked in Mescalero.'3' It was
one thing to treat each case as unique on its facts, but quite
another to hop willy-nilly from one legal gap-filling rule to
another. Judicial Indian policy was taking on the same inconsis-
tent quality as legislative Indian policy, which one congressman
described as "having all of the energy, direction and purpose of a
pup chasing its tail." ''3 The process of rule proliferation and in-
volution continued nonetheless.
United States v. Mazurie ... involved due process challenges to a
federal statute governing sales of liquor in "Indian country." The
independent authority of the tribe itself was not in issue, only
whether Congress had constitutionally delegated to it the power to
license liquor retailers. However, the Tenth Circuit ventured in
dictum to discuss tribal powers generally, and a unanimous
Supreme Court, by Justice Rehnquist, answered them, in more
dictum. It all resulted in a fleeting conceit on the part of some
tribes and their attorneys that the confused undertones of
McClanahan and Mescalero were about to give way to broad,
positive principles.
The Mazuries operated the Blue Bull Bar on ten acres of fee land
at Fort Washakie, within the borders of the Wind River Reserva-
tion. About one-fifth of the reservation is owned in fee, creating a
characteristic checkerboard pattern.'' Federal law prohibits the
sale of liquor in Indian country, which is defined as including "all
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land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, notwithstanding the is-
suance of any patent," except "fee-patented lands in non-Indian
communities," or where the tribe itself has adopted licensing
regulations not inconsistent with state law and approved by the
Secretary of the Interior."' Wind River adopted an appropriate
licensing ordinance and the Mazuries failed to obtain a license.
Resisting criminal prosecution by the United States, the Mazuries
argued that the phrase "non-Indian communities" is unconstitu-
tionally vague, and that Congress cannot delegate federal police
powers to an Indian tribe.
The Tenth Circuit complained, "There is no standard provided
as to what percentage of Indians or non-Indians is contemplated.
Thus, if a given area can be selected as a 'community,' the statute
does not indicate... what the community is if there are a greater
or lesser comparative number of Indians." 140 If the statute contain-
ed "no reasonably ascertainable standards," where did that leave
the Mazuries? Their only defense was their claim to be located in a
'non-Indian community," which the trial court denied. If an ex-
ception to a general rule is unconstitutionally vague, the exception
alone is struck out.
To avoid this result, the Tenth Circuit argued that the vague ex-
ception poisoned the entire rule. Without the general rule,
however, there would be no federal jurisdiction at all within the
Wind River Reservation except on federally owned lands. Instead
of being territorial, federal police powers would extend only to the
"checkers" of land in trust status.
In Seymour v. Superintendent,'" Washington State argued that
the inclusion of fee lands in the statutory definition of "Indian
country" was intended to be limited to Indian-owned fee lands.
For a unanimous Court, Justice Black summarily disposed of this
claim as unsubstantiated by legislative history. In addition, Black
observed that "checkerboarding" leads to chaos in law enforce-
ment, suggesting a presumption against construing any statute to
have that effect.
According to the Tenth Circuit, the facts in Mazurie were dif-
ferent. Tribal and state officers on Wind River were cross-
deputized, and the boundaries of non-Indian-owned fee lands
were well known, so that no deterioration of law enforcement
could be expected to follow from "checkerboard" jurisdiction. "2
But Seymour was not based on Black's observation that checker-
boarding is bad policy. The statute was unambiguous, and there
was nothing in its legislative history to impugn its apparent
directions. "3
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Any standard of jurisdiction based upon demography is
dangerous. Power becomes a function of a transient phenomenon,
and one which, even if objectified, as by use of census data, is not
readily ascertainable by most persons. Moreover, the in-migration
of non-Indians would be sufficient to overthrow a tribal govern-
ment's legitimacy. Tribes would face an impossible choice: to ex-
clude non-Indians from the reservation and thereby frustrate com-
merce and industry, or admit them freely and accept gradual loss
of self-governing powers. '44
The Supreme Court found no merit in the Tenth Circuit's
vagueness arguments. After reviewing the record, Justice Rehn-
quist concluded that, "[g]iven the nature of The Blue Bull's loca-
tion and surrounding population, the statute was sufficient to ad-
vise the Mazuries that their bar was not excepted from tribal
regulation by virtue of being located in a non-Indian
community.'.. However, he did not suggest what it was in the
record that he found persuasive- evidence that the standard is in-
deed too vague.
Rehnquist took more seriously the Mazuries' contention that the
United States lacks power to delegate regulatory authority to In-
dian tribes. The Tenth Circuit concluded that "[tihere is no theory
of sovereignty or governmental subdivision which would support
such a delegation,' 4 6 and suggested a broad and innovative theory
of tribal status:
The tribes have the usual powers of an owner of land, to
the extent of such ownership, over those using their lands.
This power is often confused with some elements of
sovereignty when large tracts are involved, and when only
the relationship between a Tribe and the Government is
examined."
It characterized Wind River as merely a "voluntary association,
which is obviously not a governmental agency" and therefore
unable to accept a delegation of power from Congress,' or to ex-
ercise any authority at all over nonmembers.
A landowner can exercise no power over enterers that is in-
consistent with state law, but no case had ever suggested such a
limitation upon tribes. It is not at all uncommon, moreover, for
the states to exercise authority over persons who cannot par-
ticipate in their elections and governance. They constantly
regulate the behavior of out-of-state residents in transit or
domiciled within their borders.
Rehnquist responded that Congress has power to regulate the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1977
affairs of Indians on or off-reservation, regardless of the owner-
ship status of the situs.'4 9 If the United States has authority to
regulate the Mazuries, it can moreover delegate this power,
perhaps not to private associations, but "where the entity exercis-
ing the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority
over the subject matter."'" Tribes "are a good deal more than
'private, voluntary organizations,"' he concluded, and "possess a
certain degree of independent authority over matters that affect
the internal and social relations of tribal life," intimating but not
expressly ruling that the Wind River Tribal Council may have had
power to regulate the Mazuries' business even in the absence of a
congressional grant of authority. 1' The result was to uphold tribal
licensing powers extending territorially to the exterior boundaries
of the reservation without regard to race or ownership, in this
case, but Rehnquist was careful to avoid generalization. He
neither revived "infringement" nor proposed an alternative theory
of tribal sovereignty, continuing the McClanahan tradition of de-
nying the existence of principles. Any illusions that a general ter-
ritorial sovereignty principle was in the making should have been
.shattered by DeCouteau v. District Court,' M decided two months
after Mazurie. DeCouteau involved a question already familiar to
the Court: whether Congress by opening a reservation to non-
Indian settlement had intended the dissolution of tribal self-
government. The rule of Carpenter v. Shaw that "[dloubtful ex-
pressions" are to be resolved in favor of the tribes had been inter-
preted to require that Congress' intent to terminate a tribe "be ex-
pressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding cir-
cumstances and legislative history."''
The bulk of Justice Stewart's majority opinion concentrated on
the evidence offered at trial, which he deemed sufficient to prove
that both Congress and the tribe itself understood an act of 1891 to
terminate the tribe's territorial powers.' 4 He approved of the cases
establishing a presumption against termination of a reservation,
and agreed that "[wlith the benefit of hindsight, it may be argued
that the Tribe and the Government would have been better advis-
ed to have carved out a diminished reservation," instead of ceding
.all unallotted territory, but concluded that reinstating the original
reservation as a territorial entity was simply too drastic a remedy
for bad policy.'- "Some might wish they had spoken differently,
but we cannot remake history.""' Stewart distinguished earlier
cases construing the opening of reservations to settlement on the
basis that they lacked the element of tribal consent, and did not in-
volve such strong language of cession and relinquishment.
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All apart from interpretations of the language used in the
negotiations and documents,'57 the majority avoided the fact that
the tribe had continued to act as a self-governing body after the
cession and up to the time of trial. It adopted an Indian
Reorganization Act constitution in 1946 and continued to be ad-
ministered and funded by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which
maintained an agency within the original reservation area.' 8 "This
tribe is a self-governing political community," Justice Douglas
argued in his dissent, "a status which is not lightly impaired."'5 9
While the articles of cession bound the tribe to "cede, sell, relin-
quish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title,
and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of
the reservation, ' 6 they nowhere referred to any cession of the
jurisdiction or governance of that territory.'"' Treaties of cession
are more explicit, e.g., the treaty of cession of the Louisiana Ter-
ritory to the United States: "[T]he first Consul of the French
Republic doth hereby cede to the United States, in the name of the
French Republic, forever and in full sovereignty, the said ter-
ritory, with all its rights and appurtenances, "165 Compared
with uninterrupted political recognition by the executive branch
and annual appropriations for the maintenance of tribal govern-
ment by Congress, the ambiguous language used in 1891 is weak
evidence. Moreover, subsequent acts of Congress recognizing and
subsidizing the tribe" supersede anything in the 1891 agreement
that may have terminated it as a body politic.
All jurisdictional boundaries, to be sure, create distortions: inef-
ficiencies in law enforcement, frustration or areal land-use plan-
ning, and redistributions of wealth due to tax and regulatory dif-
ferentials across the boundary. ' 6 It is a matter of degree. Divide a
simple, rectangular 1,250-square-mile tract into a checkerboard of
about eight hundred noncontiguous 160-acre allotments and a
150-mile perimeter is converted into 13,843 miles of intersecting
boundaries."
Williams and McClanahan relied on the actual historical record
of tribe-federal relationships for evidence of the tribe's status; both
made much of acts of Congress designated for the tribe's special
benefit. DeCouteau, by contrast, disregarded such evidence, rely-
ing instead upon a single, historically remote event reported
second-hand. Nor did the majority respect the rule of Carpenter v.
Shaw to construe the inconsistencies in the historical record in the
tribe's favor. This may well explain why Thurgood Marshall,
author of McClanahan, joined in Douglas' dissent to DeCouteau.
Ironically, McClanahan was decided two years before Congress
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recognized Indians' "desire" for self-government in the Indian Self-
Determination Act,' DeCouteau three months afterwards.
Only two months prior to its decision in Three Affiliated Tribes
v. Moe, the Supreme Court in a brief per curiam opinion at last
purported to apply the infringement test. Fisher v. District Court'6'
challenged a Montana state adoption action involving a minor
resident of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. Citing Williams,
McClanahan, and Mescalero. it reasoned that as there was no ap-
plicable federal statute conferring jurisdiction on the state, the
case turned on the impact of state adoption proceedings on tribal
self-government.1  Toleration of state jurisdiction would, the
Court argued, result in conflicting adjudications of custody, a
"decline in the authority of the tribal court," and a clear infringe-
ment upon the tribe's regulation of its members' domestic rela-
tions.
Like McClanahan, Fisher used the state's enabling act as one
piece of evidence that Congress had not authorized it to assume
jurisdiction over the tribe. Montana's Enabling Act, set out in part
in the opinion, includes the same "absolute jurisdiction and con-
trol" language Draper and Kake held ineffective to preserve tribal
rights. Fisher not only considered the language of the act relevant,
as McClanahan had, to rebut the legitimacy of the state's claims,
but made the remarkable statement that Cheyenne sovereignty
had been"'unaffected" by passage of the act-citing for authority
both McClanahan and Kake!'" Williams held in effect that a state,
merely by being there, could extend its jurisdiction over tribes
without express federal authorization up to thepoint that so doing
infringes upon tribal functions. According to Williams, then, the
creation of the state had affected tribal sovereignty. Fisher and
Williams apply the same test but are fundamentally contradictory
in theory.
Only a bizarre fiction can reconcile Fisher and Williams. By
hypothesis, the infringement test distinguishes between state ac-
tions that impair or affect tribal self-government and those which
do not. If the state exercises only such powers within reservations
as do not infringe upon tribal self-government, the tribe (in
theory) is no more restricted now than it was aboriginally. This is
an exercise in assuming the conclusion. The fact that the infringe-
ment test is weaker than a territorial test forces us to the conclu-
sion that some attributes of sovereignty jealously guarded by the
states have been lost to tribes after Williams. If their powers,
aboriginally, were territorial, as we have no reason to doubt they
were, then they were unmistakably "affected" by statehood.
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Fisher also tantalizes us with a fleeting reappearance of the
preemption theory of Warren. Montana argued that it had been
routinely exercising civil jurisdiction over the Cheyennes prior to
the organization of the current tribal government in 1935, and
therefore, in the absence of any express federal law to the con-
trary, had not been divested of this power. The Court responded
that the Indian Reorganization Act had "overridden" and
"preempted" Montana's prior jurisdiction."' Was the Fisher Court
coming around to the possibility that Williams itself had been a
preemption case in which the preemptive statute had been the
Reorganization Act?
It is possible to read Fisher as a return to Williams and a rejec-
tion of the long parade of intermediate cases and their involuted,
inconsistent alternative grounds of decision. But which level of
Williams7 Fisher approved of the infringement test, whereas
Warren, McClanahan, Mescalero, and the Alaskan cases had
studiously avoided it. Fisher also approved of general federal
preemption, which Mescalero had rejected. Indeed, Fisher openly
rebuffed Justice Marshall's hint in McClanahan that immunities
from state regulation are personal rights of individual Indians.
Montana challenged the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court as a
racist institution violative of the fourteenth amendment.' The
Court replied unhesitatingly that "[tihe exclusive jurisdiction of
the tribal court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but
rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe under federal law."'72 The Court was not entirely confident
that tribal jurisdiction is not racial, however, for in its next breath
it cited Morton v. Mancari as authority for the lawfulness of
reverse discrimination in federal Indian policy.'7'
I have hypothesized that the involution of a legal doctrine is
characterized by confusing the grounds for its application. Only
within that context can the appearance of Fisher be made
understandable. After Williams, the Court at once embarked
upon a program of inventing new rules and resuscitating old rules
for disposing of cases to which Williams could have been applied.
The Court also confused the role of legislation by claiming to rely
on it while frequently ignoring it or construing it carelessly, and
inventing rules superior to legislation. The reader cannot ascertain
the proper scope or future direction of each rule, and the Court ac-
quires the power to reach any result it wants, as it has any number
of different, inconsistent rules to choose from. Fisher renders the
uncertainty perfect by offering no explanation why the original
case is suddenly once again of unimpeachable validity. In Moe,
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the Court shifted to another foot, returning the infringement test
to its uneasy oblivion.
II. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe andAfter
An Economic Error
When the economic nature of a transaction is an operative fact
in the application of a federal law, state classification of the tran-
saction is not dispositive. This rule is necessary to give a uniform
effect to federal economic legislation. "State law may control only
when the federal taxing act, by express language or necessary im-
plication, makes its own operation dependent upon state law.""'
Where the form of a transaction, according to state law, differs
from its economic substance, a federal court may properly
disregard the form altogether in achieving the intended applica-
tion of federal law.'"
The Montana district court in Moe considered it relevant in ap-
plying the infringement test who actually bears the burden of
Montana's cigarette tax. Accordingly, it should have applied
preexisting federal standards or, in their absence, developed objec-
tive standards of its own. Warren would have provided some
guidance because Justice Black's argument there assumed that in-
come taxes on a non-Indian seller are partially passed on to Indian
consumers and therefore repugnant to federal policy. Under both
federal and state law, the tax paid by the Warrens was legally a tax
on them alone, but because the actual effect of the tax was rele-
vant, the Court traced it further.
However, the district court relied uncritically on Montana law,
according to which the cigarette sales tax, although levied against
the seller, is "conclusively presumed to be direct taxes upon the
retail consumer precollected for the purpose of convenience and
facility only."
In a sale to a non-Indian without payment of the tax, it is
the non-Indian consumer or user who saves the tax and reaps
the benefit of the tax exemption. It is of course recognized
that the seller would have a competitive advantage over non-
Indian sellers on the Reservation as well as both Indian and
non-Indian sellers off the Reservation through selling at a
lower price. '
These two sentences are consistent with each other only if the
seller passes on 100 per cent of his tax saving to consumers in the
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form of lower prices. To begin with, there is no evidence that non-
taxed Indian sellers have been doing this. The Director of Revenue
of Washington State, an outspoken critic of Indian tax exemp-
tions, recently estimated that about 55-80 per cent of the tax sav-
ing is passed on, the rest being retained by the seller.Y If this is
true, the Indian seller is both a direct and an indirect beneficiary
of the exemption: saved tax in excess of price cuts, and increased
volume.
Less than a 100 per cent pass-through of tax savings is predicted
from economic theory. Whether a rational seller passes on any
cost saving depends upon the anticipated impact of the change in
price on volume (or "demand"). He will reduce his unit price by a
penny only if it will result in more than a penny's-worth of addi-
tional units being sold.
Economists describe this in terms of "elasticity of demand." De-
mand is said to be elastic when changes in price produce relatively
greater changes in volume. Conversely, demand is said to be in-
elastic when changes in price produce relatively smaller changes in
volume. The elasticity of demand for a good is ordinarily a func-
tion of price. In a competitive market, how much of a tax saving
will be retained by, say, cigarette retailers depends upon the
elasticity of demand for cigarettes in the relevant price range.
Pre-Moe cigarette retailing was not an altogether competitive
market, however, because the tax exemption was only available to
some retailers, and competition among these retailers was limited
by voluntary coordination and tribal regulation. Under such cir-
cumstances economic theory predicts two relatively uniform
prices: a nonexempt or "non-Indian" price, and a slightly lower
exempt or "Indian" price. Because non-Indian retailers cannot
reduce their prices further, all the coordinated Indian retailers
must do to corner the market is to offer a price that just more than
offsets consumers' added cost and inconvenience in going to In-
dian reservations to shop. '78 In a "segmentary" market sellers
therefore often retain more of a tax saving than in a freely com-
petitive market. Cigarettes are probably rather demand-inelastic,
predicting fairly high retention of tax savings by sellers. Add to
this the segmentary nature of the market under Indian tax-
exemption conditions, and Washington state's estimate of 20-45
per cent retention seems quite conservative. According to the
district court, Warren held that a gross income tax is an economic
burden on the seller.' Both the gross income tax in Warren and
the sales tax in Moe were collected from the sellers. How is it
possible that the former is absorbed by the seller but the latter by
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the purchaser? Economics is no respecter of legal labels. Costs are
passed on in response to what the market will bear. It is irrelevant
whether the cost is called a gross income tax or a precollected sales
tax. A 5 per cent gross income tax will be distributed between
sellers and purchasers in roughly the same proportion as a 5 per
cent sales tax on the same goods.
Warren was not applicable, however, the district court reason-
ed, because it involved a federally licensed trader, and the plaintiff
in Moe was simply an Indian retailer.' If anything, however, this
distinction cuts the other way. The Warrens were non-Indians,
but they were immunized from state taxation on the theory that
they served a federal purpose. The fact that they were licensed by
the United States was accepted as evidence of federal preemption.
But the original reason for licensing was to protect Indians from
unscrupulous non-Indian traders by specifying the conditions of
their entry into Indian country.'8 ' Understandably, then, Indian
retailers have never been required to obtain licenses, although
they may own and manage their property under federal supervi-
sion. This cannot mean that they were intended to be less pro-
tected from state action than licensed traders.
The district court painstakingly avoided the fact that the seller
was an Indian business person. Congress has repeatedly pro
claimed its interest in reservation business development, to that
end providing special loans and loan guarantees for Indians in ad-
dition to those ordinarily available from general federal
agencies.'82 It is too late to doubt that there is an express federal
policy of encouraging Indian private enterprise. But try to follow
this reasoning of the Moe Court:
It is clear that the collection of the tax by the Indian seller
would impose no tax burden on the Indians residing on the
Reservation; nor would it infringe in any way upon self-
government. It may reasonably be inferred that the stores
were not established primarily for the benefit of Indian
customers residing on the reservation, but rather to sell
cigarettes to prospective customers passing on the
highway .... The Indian seller profits from increased sales.
The non-Indian purchasers avoid the payment of a tax legally
imposed upon them.
For whose benefit were these stores established? A pragmatist
would certainly answer: for the benefit of the owners! Because the
owners are Indians, and the court admits, however obtusely, that
the state tax depresses sales, reservation Indians do benefit from
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/2
non-Indians' sales tax immunity. Congress has been a great deal
more explicit in recent years about its interest in promoting Indian
businesses than its interest in cutting prices to Indian consumers.
The court almost says that Indian business people are not really
Indians, so that the benefits they enjoy are not really benefits to
Indians. This might not have been out of line fifty years ago, when
an Indian was said to have "severed his tribal connections" as soon
as he began to farm or labor. Congress has rejected that notion. It
is high time the courts did.
The district court confused the situation still further by
announcing an entirely new rule for determining the limits of state
power over reservations, proposing that Indian retailers are
"involved with non-Indians to a degree" that would permit
Montana to require precollection of the tax.l s What is the meaning
of being "involved" with non-Indians? The court appears to be
saying that only transactions among Indians are free from state
regulation. Unfortunately, reservations, in common with all
political subdivisions of this country, must live by commerce, and
most of that commerce will unavoidably be with non-Indians. If
the court is satisfied that by engaging in commerce with non-
Indians the tribes become subject to state control, it has concluded
in effect that tribes must remain poor if they wish to be
self-governing.
It was only in a supplemental opinion that the district court con-
sidered any economic facts. Emphasizing its obligation to serve its
Indian and non-Indian residents equally and the fact that 27 per
cent of the children in its Flathead Reservation schools are Indians,
Montana claimed that the federal government contributes only
about 10 per cent as much to the support of these schools as the
state."' Montana was actually receiving federal funds for Indian
education from four different sources: impact aid, specifically
designed to compensate states for the nontaxability of federally
controlled lands;' the Johnson-O'Malley program, supposed to
compensate states directly for the costs of educating Indians;... and
both Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and
the Indian Education Act, intended to underwrite remedial and
cultural enrichment programs.'" A study published in 1971 con-
cluded that many school districts were being overcompensated;' '
a second study in 1975 described these programs as "redundant"
and suggested that they offset the entire state cost of educating
Indians." But Montana only told the district court about its im-
pact aid, and, judging from total national expenditures, that
would have been about 26 per cent of its total federal Indian
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education grants.' 9' Montana also failed to distinguish in its "state
contribution" figure state taxes on Indian-owned fee lands and
taxes paid by Indians in off-reservation transactions.'92 In fact,
Congress granted Montana school lands within Indian reserva-
tions before the Indian Reorganization Act,' 3 and the revenue
from these was omitted in the state's presentation. It is therefore
entirely possible that Montana was gaining money through its
reservation school districts.
"Benefit-burden" arguments are two-sided. The district court
conceded that the $12 million expended annually on the reserva-
tion by the tribe and the United States is "substantial," and that at
least some of it benefited non-Indian reservation residents.'"
About 81 per cent of the residents of the Flathead Reservation are
non-Indian.' 5 Although many tribal services, such as income
maintenance, are limited to tribal members, other services such as
police and fire protection, some roads, and utilities are equally en-
joyed by all residents. Since the state taxes the property and in-
come of non-Indian reservation residents without limitation, it is
overcompensated to the extent of the tribal services delivered to
these persons.
Having suggested the possible significance of benefit-burden
data and reported Montana's claims of undercompensation, the
district court was at a loss over how to proceed. "We are unable,"
it complained, "to determine with exactitude the net effect of the
loss of tax revenues to the state ... because of the unique status of
the Reservation and the Indians living thereon."'9 6 At the very
least, the court should have required the state to bear the burden
of proving a substantial net loss from Indian tax immunities. It is
elementary that courts do not simply assume that a party has been
injured on the basis of its own unsubstantiated allegations.
Fortunately, the district court rejected the state's argument that
the Flathead Reservation no longer existed. ' There was no
evidence of congressional or tribal intent comparable to that in-
troduced in DeCouteau, although in his dissent Judge Russell
Smith argued that the reservation would have become completely
absorbed into Montana had Congress not cut short the allotment
program as early as it did, and that it had never been as complete-
ly self-governing as the Navajos."8 He also argued that reservation
tax immunities are unconstitutional because they have purely
racial criteria, a suggestion the majority rejected on the basis that
federal legislation applies to members of treaty tribes, i.e., a
political rather than racial category, and fulfills a special federal
responsibility."
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The most significant point made in the dissent was that
members of the tribe are also legally citizens of the state of
Montana.' As Judge Smith observed, this paradox has never been
reconciled. The Indian Reorganization Act post-dated Indian
citizenship by ten years and negates the implication that Congress
intended the Citizenship Act to dissolve the political existence of
tribes. The Citizenship Act has nevertheless been interpreted to
guarantee reservation Indians the right to vote and hold office in
the states. Judge Smith reasoned that Indians cannot have it both
ways-they must assume all of the burdens, as well as the benefits
of state citizenship. However, he ignores the alternative. Tribal
members never demanded state citizenship to the exclusion of
tribal self-government. If the two are incompatible, tribes may
reasonably choose to assume full self-governing powers and relin-
quish claims to participate in the state political process." '
Error Vindicated
The writing of the Supreme Court's opinion in Moe fell to
Justice Rehnquist, author of Mazurie. His reasoning again failed
to crystallize the issues. If anything they emerge less structured
than before. However, one thing was decided unambiguously: the
holding of the district court would stand.
At the outset Rehnquist confused the grounds for federal
jurisdiction to enjoin state collection of the tax with the basis for
the claimed tax immunity."2 While Section 1362 of Title 28 of the
United States Code confers original jurisdiction on federal district
courts to determine civil actions brought by tribes to resolve
federal questions, Section 1341 of the same title, an earlier statute,
prohibits federal courts from enjoining the collection of a state tax
"where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.20 3
The district court disposed of this conflict by noting that the
barrier of Section 1341 is not applicable to cases brought by the
United States "to protect itself and its instrumentalities from un-
constitutional state exactions."20' Rehnquist agreed. Relying on
two cases decided more than fifty years before enactment of Sec-
tion 1362,05 he concluded that the United States has always had
authority to invoke the jurisdiction of its own courts to protect its
Indian programs from state interference. With no more founda-
tion than an ambiguous sentence in the report of the House
Judiciary Committee, he reasoned that Section 1362 had implicitly
extended the same authority to the tribes themselves."
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Montana urged the Court to apply Mescalero as a bar to federal
jurisdiction.' In a judicious footnote, Rehnquist agreed that the
early cases he cited for federal jurisdiction were "grounded in the
federal instrumentality doctrine," which Mescalero had "effective-
ly eliminated ... as a basis for immunizing Indians from state
taxation."' ' He admitted this gives rise to "a certain inconsisten-
cy," and attempted to reconcile it by distinguishing jurisdiction
from substantive law. For jurisdictional purposes, he explained, a
tribe is a federal instrumentality, but once jurisdiction has been
established, it ceases to be a federal instrumentality and must
specifically allege and prove express congressional intent that it
have each claimed tax immunity! 21
Recognizing that McClanahan can be read for a presumption
against state power, the state tried to argue that such a presump-
tion is inappropriate in the case of the Flatheads, a tribe, it con-
tended, substantially less autonomous historically than the Nava-
jo. Rehnquist agreed with the district court that the Flathead Tribe
is "now so completely integrated with the non-Indians... that
there is no longer any reason to accord them different treatment
from other citizens." ' But in so doing he implicitly conceded the
legitimacy of a demographic test of tribal sovereignty, which he
rejected in Mazurie. Nor did he indicate what evidence, if any, he
would accept to prove that another tribe is substantially
assimilated and therefore not entitled to presumption in its
favor."'
Rehnquist proceeded to Williams. He refused to reconsider the
district court's economically absurd finding that the purchaser
bears the tax, agreeing that Montana law is determinative.2
However, the district court had repeatedly remarked on the com-
petitive advantage given the Indian retailer by the tax immunity,
cutting against its own holding for the state. Rehnquist would not
permit this to stand either, lest it suggest any "infringement" of the
tribe by the state tax.
Since nonpayment of the tax is a misdemeanor as to the
retail purchaser, the competitive advantage which the Indian
seller doing business on tribal land enjoys ... is dependent on
the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser is willing to
flout his legal obligation to pay the tax. Without the simple
expedient of having the retailer collect the sales tax from non-
Indian purchasers, it is clear that wholesale violations of the
law by the latter class will go virtually unchecked.'"
In other words, the Indian sellers' competitive advantage arises
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solely from non-Indians' violations of Montana law, and is
therefore, by implication, not a legitimate Indian interest forin-
fringement test purposes. Of course, the whole issue in the case
was whether purchases of unstamped cigarettes on tribal land is in
violation of Montana law. Rehnquist assumed his conclusion.
Having dismissed all of the evidence that the state tax would be
a direct economic burden on Indian retailers, Rehnquist turned to
the question of whether Indian retailers' required precollection of
the tax from consumers would itself be administratively burden-
some and involve risk of state prosecution. Williams held that
state courts cannot reach Indians within a reservation without
their consent because to do so would infringe upon reservation
self-government and reservation courts. Fisher agreed. 24 Rehn-
quist did not even suggest a reason for his conclusion that there is
"nothing in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government.""'
If this is true, it is difficult to see what it was in Williams and
Fisher that did frustrate tribal self-government.
The states have two means of enforcing their taxing rights under
Moe: prosecution of non-Indian consumers in possession of un-
taxed cigarettes, and the power to search vehicles entering and
leaving reservations. The district court's opinion rejected the first
of these as "costly and ineffective," but "[miore importantly, it
would mean that the Indian seller of the cigarettes could aid and
encourage non-Indians in disobeying the law and be immune from
prosecution.1 1 6 The power to search and seize vehicles entering
and leaving the reservation would seem to be adequate to enforce
state retail sales tax laws. It is difficult to understand how Indian
retailers could "help" customers avoid such a scheme. Further-
more, administrative efficiency is usually not a sufficient basis for
deciding questions of jurisdiction. It is frustrating for a city such as
New York to collect its nonresident income taxes from out-of-
staters, but that does not legitimize its attaching and executing
against out-of-state land or other property. Most due process
rights are "inefficient," if we examine only their administrative
cost."'
Williams referred to "the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be governed by them" as synonymous with in-
fringement. The power to make a law must also be the power to
forebear to make it. Either may serve a rational policy. In
Williams there was no required finding that the Navajo Tribe had
provided civil remedies for debt in its courts, before a Navajo
could claim immunity from a debt action in a state court. Thus, in
Williams, the state had not interfered with a tribal law, but with a
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subject matter upon which the tribe might legislate. Consistent
with Williams, a state's power to tax within a reservation should
riot turn upon whether the tribe taxes the same objects.
Suppose, in a future case, the tribe does levy its own sales tax. If
the Court assumes that sales taxes fall entirely on consumers, it
will also assume that collection of a state sales tax will have no ef-
fect on collection of a tribal sales tax: both will be borne by con-
sumers. The extra tax will depress sales, but the Court has already
dismissed the relevance of this effect.
Economically, simultaneous state and tribal taxation would
pose problems for both governments. Increasing the tax load on
goods will usually have some effect, greater or lesser depending
upon the elasticity of demand, upon volume of sales. The yield of
a sales tax is a function of both the size of the tax (tax effort) and
the number of taxable units sold. Within a certain range, increases
in tax effort will increase tax yield. Beyond that range, increases in
tax effort will actually decrease tax yield by substantially depress-
ing sales. The fact that Indian cigarette retailers before Moe did
not actually pass on all of their tax savings is evidence that they
would largely bear any additional taxes. Tribes would therefore
have some difficulty collecting a large tax, assuming that they ever
chose to take a course of action so potentially ruinous to tribal
businesses.
Williams could be interpreted to stand for the right of Indians
to be governed by their own laws, reading the second clause of the
sentence with greater emphasis than the first. The corollary
would, of course, be that there is no right or obligation for
non-Indians to be governed by Indian laws. Neither Williams nor
McClanahan rebut this implication because both are cases in
which state law was to be applied to an Indian. Warren involved a
non-Indian, but it can be reconciled with the other cases on the
grounds that it rests on an entirely different rule-that trading
posts are peculiar federal instrumentalities wholly governed by
federal statutes.
Moe does not suggest that tribes lack power to regulate non-
Indians within their borders, a power already well established in
the tax field,' 8 and not precluded in other subject areas." ' It must
be construed as embracing a notion of concurrent tribe-state
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation, to the extent that
these non-Indians' activities do not directly affect Indians.
As precedent, Moe provides the Court with still more room to
equivocate in tribal jurisdiction cases. "Infringement" implies that
jurisdiction over a reservation transaction between an Indian and
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a non-Indian must be tribal to protect the Indian party's interest in
being governed by his own law. Moe indicates that if the
"beneficiary" of the transaction is non-Indian, the transaction is
susceptible to concurrent state jurisdiction. The concept of
"benefit" lacks economic sensibility and renders future applica-
tions of the Williams test uncertain.
Who was the beneficiary of the credit sale in Williams, the non-
Indian seller or the Indian purchaser? I think it is clear that both
intended to benefit, and that the law governing their transaction
would affect both of them. Moe's premise that certain bilateral
transactions affect only one of the parties, although it may be
economically nonsensical, presents a possibility that "exclusive"
tribal jurisdiction will henceforth be limited to cases where the
Court believes the Indian party is substantially affected, or more
substantially affected than the non-Indian party.
Williams substituted a subject-matter test of tribal jurisdiction
for a territorial test, but at least it did not preclude the possibility
that tribal power over approved subject-matter is preemptive. Ac-
cording to Moe, tribal jurisdiction is preemptive over Indians and
concurrent over non-Indians. McClanahan, it will be recalled,
hinted that reservation Indians' jurisdictional rights are personal
rather than territorial in origin, and in Moe Rehnquist suggested
that the proper standard of decision is whether the state action in-
terferes with Congress' plans to protect individual Indians, not the
tribe's right to self-government.
Only a year earlier in Mazurie Rehnquist rejected the Tenth Cir-
cuit's theory that tribes are mere voluntary associations. The
Montana district court equated tribes with private landowners. A
private association of tenants in common has more power over
members than nonmembers, although it has limited power to con-
trol nonmembers' activities while they are within its property.
This is roughly the situation of tribes after Moe.
The Forgotten Legislative Record
Throughout its treatment of reservation jurisdiction, the Court
has expressed a desire to scrupulously execute the manifest will of
Congress. Nonetheless its treatment of at least one extremely per-
tinent law leaves much -to be desired. The Buck Act- ° speaks
directly to the issue, authorizing the states to tax motor fuels,"21
sales and use, 22 and income' within "Federal Areas," and af-
fording some basis upon which to exclude Indian reservations and
reservation activities from its effect. Federal "instrumentalities"
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are expressly exempt,"4 but, of course, since Mescalero the Court
no longer includes tribes and tribal operations in this category.
The Buck Act does not authorize taxes "on or from any Indian not
otherwise taxed,22' but that speaks to a personal right of Indians
not inconsistent with the holdings of Williams, Warren, or
McClanahan, or the rule of Moe. It says nothing about taxation
of non-Indians on reservations.
"Federal Area" is defined as lands "held or acquired by or for
the use of the United States or any department, establishment, or
agency, of the United States. '" 2 26 Do Indian reservations fit this
description? It would be hard to characterize them as "for the use
of the United States," especially since the Indian Reorganization
Act describes reservation lands as being "for the exclusive use of
Indians." 27 Tribes and their members are the beneficial owners of
all tribal and allotted lands within reservations, although the
United States, as "trustee," may be the record owner".2 " The United
States is accountable to the tribal beneficiaries in the same manner
as any other fiduciary."
There is even a question as to whether all reservation land was
"acquired by" the United States. Although much was purchased
for tribes under the authority of the Indian Reorganization Act,
much more consists of original tribal territory that was simply
never ceded to the United States. Congress has elsewhere expressly
distinguished between purchased and original reservation lands.",
When a tribe cedes some of its original domain, reserving the
balance as a reservation by treaty, this reserved balance is hardly
"acquired by" the United States.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise "exclusive
Legislation" over the District of Columbia and "over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines. Arsenals,
Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings."' ' The relationship
between this provision and Congress' power to "make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States" 2 has never been completely un-
tangled. The debates on the draft Constitution suggest that the
property clause was to apply to lands acquired outside of the
states, and the exclusive legislation clause to lands purchased from
the states. In any event, the two clauses together undoubtedly en-
compass lands "acquired by or for the use of the United States."
The Marshall Court attributed federal Indian powers to the
treaty and commerce clauses, appropriately enough, a view con-
curred in by more recent Courts.2 Although in dealing with reser-
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vation jurisdiction the Court once analogized to the federal power
to govern territories, it argued that this power does not arise from
the property clause, but out of necessity.Y' If Indian reservations
are governed by the treaty or commerce clause, or even by some
principle of necessity, they are not subject to laws enacted under
any of the other parts of the Constitution. There were Indian
reservations in 1947. If the draftsmen of the Buck Act had wanted
to include Indian reservations, they could have done so explicitly.
As worded, the Act appers to be no broader than the authority of
the property and exclusive legislation clauses."
That Congress can speak clearly when it wants to on such mat-
ters is evidenced by the Federal Power Act, 6 passed ten years
subsequent to the Buck Act. Section 3(2) of the Federal Power Act
defines "reservations" as "national forests, tribal lands embraced
within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands
and interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn,
reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal
under the public land laws." The Supreme Court has interpreted
this to make federal ownership the operative fact. Hence, an In-
dian community, albeit recognized by the United States, is not a
"reservation" for F.P.A. purposes if located on fee patented
lands.
The Assimilative Crimes Act is limited in scope to lands
"reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States." 8
The phrase "exclusive use" facilitates interpretation; it cannot
refer to lands in which local governments or private persons have
some interest. The sponsor of the Act in 1825 described it as ap-
plicable to crimes "in a fort, magazine, arsenal, or dockyard,
belonging to the United States." 9 Indian reservations in their con-
temporary form did not exist in 1825. Nevertheless when the Act
was revised in 1908, long after the establishment of the current
reservation system, the sponsors of the revision interpreted the
"exclusive use" language as limiting its scope to a "postoffice,
court-house, or public building." 40
The records of Congress indicate, however, that while the
definition of "Federal Area" in the Buck Act seems to exclude In-
dian reservations, tax protection was intended to be limited strict-
ly to "Indian(s) not otherwise taxed." The original bill referred to
"national parks, military and other reservations," without further
definition.24' However, it was vigorously supported by the states
of Arizona, New Mexico, and Washington in the apparent expec-
tation, not denied by any member of Congress, that Indian reser-
vations were to be deemed "other reservations." ' Senator
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LaFollette of Wisconsin introduced an amendment that would
have made the Buck Act inapplicable to "any transaction" occur-
ring within an Indian reservation. Supported by the Interior
Department, it was vigorously opposed by Senator Buck and the
states."4 3
On the other hand, no desire was expressed to tax reservation
Indians. Representative Dempsey of New Mexico expressed
himself agreeable to exempting all sales to Indians from the opera-
tion of the Act."' Even the Interior Department was unwilling to
press for the "any transactions" language of the LaFollette amend-
rnent, expressing itself concerned solely for taxes levied directly
upon Indians."
All of the bitterness vented at the hearings was directed at non-
Indians. Dixwell Pierce of the California Board of Equalization
hoped the Buck Act would "prevent these borders of the reserva-
tions from becoming barriers behind which private persons en-
gaged in business ... may hide and say unpleasant things to those
of us who are trying to collect taxes uniformly within the State.. ' .
Representative Dempsey complained about "tourists" and non-
Indians resettling on Indian reservations to evade taxes, adding his
opinion that the land acquisition provisions of the Indian
Reorganization Act were a "subterfuge" of Congress to deprive the
states of taxes.247 He also promised that if any Indians began to
operate their own retail businesses, New Mexico would not seek to
tax their sales to anyone, Indian or non-Indian.
The Buck Act was most heatedly opposed by the armed forces.
Representatives of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps testified
against it; it was also opposed by the House Committee on Naval
Affairs."8 Their objections to state taxation of purchases made by
military personnel at military stores were met with unanimous
agreement that federal "instrumentalities" should remain tax
exempt." ' There seems to have been a general understanding that
military personnel, the same as military property, are "instrumen-
talities" of the United States while on federal land and when
engaging in transactions with the United States.
It thus appears that the Supreme Court could have reached the
Moe result merely by reading the Buck Act and its legislative
history-thirty years earlier. Moe purports to follow Williams
but it is not an infringement case, unless the most obvious basic
realities are ignored. Nor is it a preemption case, and certainly it is
not a case of territorial jurisdiction. Although Rehnquist nowhere
admitted to it, Moe is, after all, an instrumentality case. In-
dividual Indians within Indian reservations are the instrumentali-
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ty, just like the individual military personnel within military reser-
vations. Indian property is exempt while it remains in Indian
hands because it shares the status of character of the possessor.
When leased, it assumes the character of the lessee.2"
The Supreme Court acknowledged the Buck Act briefly in
Warren " and again in McClanahan. 3 Neither opinion accorded it
much significance. Justice Marshall observed in passing in
McClanahan that,
While the Buck Act itself cannot be read as an affirmative
grant of tax-exempt status to reservation Indians, it should be
obvious that Congress would not have jealously protected
the immunity of reservation Indians from state income taxa-
tion had it thought that the States had residual power to im-
pose such taxes.
He referred, of course, only to the express exemption of reserva-
tion Indians in the Act.
Why did the Court miss such a straightforward solution? The
Moe rule is actually broader than the Buck Act. It suggests that all
tribal powers exercised over non-Indians are concurrent with the
states. It is a general statement about the nature of the reservation-
state boundary, while the Buck Act was merely a concession of
some reservation revenue to the states." By ignoring the full
significance of the Buck Act, the Court established itself superior
to Congress in determining the nation's Indian policy. Nor was
this the only occasion on which the Court avoided close reading of
the laws it purports to strictly construe and apply. In Mescalero,
the Court busied itself looking for express exemptions of tribal
lands, not express delegations. This is what Douglas criticized,
and why he made a point of reminding the Court of Carpenter v.
Shaw and the rule of liberal construction in favor of tribes. Title
25 of the United States Code is a maze of innuendoes and negative
inferences in the tax area, many not yet discovered by the Court.
For example, the rules for granting rights-of-way for pipelines and
telephone lines across tribal and allotted lands provide that
"nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to exempt the
owners of such lines from the payment of any tax that may be
lawfully assessed against them by either State, Territorial, or
municipal authority," and then refers mysteriously to lines "not
subject to State or Territorial taxation.""5 Which lines did Con-
gress assume were subject to local taxation in 1901 and 1904 when
it originally enacted these laws?
These tax-saving clauses do not appear in the right-of-way rules
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for railroads enacted at about the same time. 6 We are left with the
impression that some rights-of-way on some reservations are tax-
able and others are not, but Congress offers us no further
guidance. There were no other federal laws at this time to provide
clarification, so Congress must have assumed that the courts had
already formulated adequate rules and needed only to be pre-
served from statutory interference. But there were no clear judicial
rules. The Supreme Court heard no major reservation tax case
between 1867 and 1903, and in the latter case departed completely
from the rule of the former.1
7
Congress was clearer twenty years later when it dealt with inci-
pient reservation resource development and authorized state taxa-
tion of oil, gas, and minerals severed from tribally owned lands,
without power of foreclosure.28 Congress also empowered the
states to tax any or all of the property rights of lessees of tribally
owned lands within Executive Order reservations.' When it pro-
vided for the lease and sale of timber and other reservation
resources, however, state taxation was not mentioned.2" Lessees'
reservation property, other than severed minerals or property on
Executive Order reservations, must therefore be tax exempt. Yet,
in recent years, the Supreme Court has consistently approved of
state taxation of such interests, relying on common law
principles." '
A decade later, the Indian Reorganization Act provided that
"lands or rights acquired" for tribes under its authority "be exempt
from State and local taxation. 262 Did this supersede the tax provi-
sions just discussed? If so, then mineral production from tribally
owned lands acquired after 1934 is tax exempt. This interpretation
is supported by the language of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act
passed in 1936,." Like I.R.A., this subsequent law authorized land
acquisition and exempts the acquired lands from state taxation.
However, it specifically excepts oil and gas production from the
exemption, saving, in effect, the earlier provisions for state provi-
sions for state taxation of these minerals. When Congress later
enacted special land-acquisition programs for individual tribes,
tax exemption or nonexemption was provided for expressly.'" As
far as I can determine, the Supreme Court has never considered
the effect of these statutes on one another.
If Congress can be explicit, it rarely chooses to do so. Title 25
includes only one truly general rule of tribe-state jurisdictional
conflicts: the states can condemn allotted lands.' Elsewhere,
references are made to the most limited cases. For example, a
handful of tribes were subjected by statute to state probate laws
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for limited purposes or periods of time.' Doesn't this imply that
the states lack probate jurisdiction in all other cases? One tribe
may mortgage land-subject to state law. 7 Until 1973, when Con-
gress granted a blanket state and federal tax exemption to Indian
claims judgment fund distributions,2 ' a separate provision was
enacted for each individual tribal judgment creditor. Provisions
for taxation of tribal assets upon liquidation were equally diverse.
Some granted immunity from both federal and state taxation (or
simply "taxation"),' 9 some from federal taxation alone,' 7' and
some allowed no exemption at all."' Special, more complex ex-
emption schemes are also found." Congress obviously has no dif-
ficulty being specific about tax status in dealing with distributions
of funds or property to Indians. Why, then, has it never spoken
more clearly to reservation tax status generally? 273
It is understandable that the Court shies away from comprehen-
sive statutory interpretations, tending rather (as in McClanahan)
to select one or two isolated examples for boilerplating. What is so
remarkable is the Court's loud protestation that the statutes are
all-defining and quite clear. In effect, the Court has been
searching, unsuccessfully and erratically, for general principles to
fill the vacuum left by Congress, and blaming Congress for the un-
successful and erratic results.
III. The Politics and Economics of Moe
Taxation and Public Policy
Taxation is an essential function of government. Our own
political traditions affirm this general principle. Alexander
Hamilton wrote in The Federalist:
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle
of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion
and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A com-
plete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate
supply of revenue, as far as the resources of the community
will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient
in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular one
of two evils must ensure: either the people must be subjected
to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode
of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink
into a fatal atrophy and in a short course of time perish. 7
"How is it possible," he asked, "that a government, half sup-
plied and always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institu-
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tion; can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or sup-
port the reputation of the commonwealth?"
The same observations can be applied with equal force to state,
local, and tribal government. Indeed, there is growing awareness
of the negative impact of current high levels of federal taxation on
the abilities of the states to support their own domestic
programs, 5 a danger the anti-Federalists warned of during the
ratification controversy. 6 If the tenth amendment preserves the
right and power of the states to regulate their domestic affairs, it
does not, however, appear to guarantee them sufficient resources
to that end.
The taxing power must be understood as serving similar func-
tions both in its exercise and nonexercise. Whether an object is
taxed or not is a question of distributive policy and economic effi-
ciency. The same result can be accomplished by a tax or an exemp-
tion, but at a different cost of administration and with greater or
lesser effectiveness.
In capitalist political theory, the government should become in-
volved in the production of goods only to the extent that the
market fails to supply them. A "public good"' is exemplified by
national defense. An effective defense system requires national
coverage and central control. It is difficult to imagine how in-
clividual citizens could "buy" defense from private suppliers.
Another example of a public good is "infrastructure," the network
of transportation, communication, and supply lines that increase
the value of land as a place to locate a residence, business, or in-
clustry. Infrastructure costs tend to be great and are paid back
very slowly by utility users. It is usually not profitable for an in-
clividual to create an infrastructure and depend upon immigrants
to pay him for it. There are exceptions: many real estate sub-
dividers bear infrastructure costs such as sewer and power lines,
and then sell the increased value of the sites.
Industrial infrastructure, like defense, is also much more
valuable when it is planned and comprehensive, rather than "just
growing" like Topsy. Imagine, for example, a highway system
built in sections by each adjacent landowner. These considerations
justify government in taxing the public and buying the public
good itself. The taxes collected should, dollar for dollar of benefits
acquired, be considerably less than the cost of providing similar
benefits through the private marketplace.
Another efficiency justification for taxation arises when an ac-
tivity imposes costs on others and there exists no adequate private
remedy. This is the theory behind proposals for "effluent
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discharge taxes" on industrial polluters. The effects of industrial
pollution are widely and thinly spread out through the popula-
tion. It would be extremely costly for all affected to individually
press legal claims against the polluters; the cost of each action
might well exceed the value of each individual claim. 78 Unless the
industry is forced to bear (or "internalize") its true costs, however,
it will operate at an inefficiently high level of output dictated by its
deceptively large profit margin. A tax on the industry propor-
tional to the estimated "external" cost of its activities reduces its
profits and slows its operation. The revenue can be applied to the
relief of persons affected by the industry, and the cost of ad-
ministering a single tax would be less than that of bringing
numerous lawsuits.
A tax may also serve purely distributive functions. These, too,
are legitimate aspects of public policy. A tax on liquor sales with
revenue applied to education has the effect of decreasing con-
sumption of liquor. It reduces the relative welfare of people who
choose to drink. There may be an arguable efficiency considera-
tion, such as benefits gained to the public at large from fewer
drunk drivers (everyone experiences a lowered risk of traumatic
death). But in some cases it may simply reflect a negative public
attitude toward drinking.
Just as a tax can decrease the rate of activity, a subsidy can in-
crease it. Tax and subsidy are frequently combined. A less favored
activity is taxed and the proceeds are distributed to a more
favored one. Another incarnation of the tax subsidy is a tax ex-
emption or immunity from a general tax. Tax exemptions, like
taxes, may have efficiency or distributive objectives. A common
theory in the nineteenth century was that certain industries,
especially railroads and canals, benefited more people than those
who paid fares to use them. This "external" benefit, the same as an
external cost, needed to be quantified and entered into the in-
dustry's calculations so that it would operate at the proper level of
output . A railroad adjusts its activities to the fares it collects, not
to all of the benefits it produces. Finding some way for it to enjoy
the value of all of its benefits will, presumably, increase its ac-
tivities and attract more investment in railroading. Income tax
deductions, special depreciation allowances, and tax-exempt
bonds are all possible ways of using the tax system for this pur-
pose.
Tax exemptions and direct subsidies can be used to accelerate
growth. Free market theory assures us that if a newly developed
product is net beneficial (benefits outweigh costs), it will be pro-
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duced and marketed. But in the real world there is a lag time dur-
ing which manufacturers save capital and expand up to the full
capacity that consumer demand will bear. This process can be ac-
celerated by granting manufacturers free capital, by lowering their
taxes and thereby increasing their savings rate, or, as many courts
have done in the case of experimental drugs, immunizing them
from liability for the unforeseen dangers (costs) of their products.
We obtain only what the free market would have provided, but
sooner.
Indian reservations are particularly needy of tax incentives for
two reasons, underdevelopment and uniquely high business costs.
Already far behind the rest of the nation in income and employ-
rnent, tribes have a legitimate interest in accelerating economic
growth on reservations. They have such paltry tax bases, con-
sisting largely of federal employees' incomes and the very
businesses they seek to attract,'" that an offer of shelter from state
taxes is far more realistic than direct subsidization. The only alter-
native is for tribes to demand more grant money from Congress
and redistribute it as subsidies to attract businesses from off-
reservation, or use it to supply infrastructure. The irony is plain.
The states tax reservation businesses, slowing reservation
development. The tribes respond by demanding more costly
federal economic development programs, which must be funded
out of increasing national taxes. These decrease the states' tax
bases further, leading to increased state pressure for control and
taxation of the reservations. The only way to break the circle is to
give tribes preemptive power throughout their territories not to
tax. 8S
A second factor is the high cost of doing business on reserva-
tions. This results from federal regulation of tribal business ac-
tivities and the use of tribal resources, and the continuing enigma
of state jurisdiction on the reservation. Uncertainty, added delay,
and administrative costs ("transactions costs") make the reserva-
tion, all other things being equal, costlier than the state as a situs
for business."' Tribes cannot reduce these costs directly; they are
in the complete control of Congress, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
and the courts. But tribes can offset these costs by offering tax
shelter to relocating businesses. Deprived of the ability to offer tax
shelter, tribes must fall back on a much less desirable strategy:
price concessions. To attract industry and employment they may
have to agree to sell their resources at a substantial discount, or to
provide labor at uncommonly low wage rates."2'
Although Congress is responsible both for high transactions
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costs on reservations and for the diminishing tax capacity of the
states, tribes and states view one another as the real adversaries.
Because the federal government has made the states responsible
for many essential services to tribal members, the tribes have little
choice but to demand these services without cost. They are poor.
Tribal resources are managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
are taxed for its use. As a treaty party the United States may have
some obligation to serve Indians without cost arising from
treaties, but the states, lacking treaties or control, naturally feel
imposed upon when delegated service responsibilities. Instead of
insisting that the United States fully assume its responsibilities, the
states attack tribes, which are more vulnerable, and fight over
relatively minor concessions.
During the Buck Act hearings, specific estimates of state tax
losses due to federal areas were very low. California argued that
its revenues would increase about 1 / per cent if it could tax sales
and use on all federal lands within its borders.' Illinois com-
plained of several large military posts, but attributed only a
$23,800 tax loss to them, scarcely a percentage point in that state's
budget.' Today, the tax loss figures are larger but still an in-
significant part of states' revenues. Washington State estimates a
loss of $5.4 million annually on cigarette sales taxes, less than .1
per cent of its current total annual revenue.'
In many ways, state pressure for control of tribal tax bases is
self-defeating. Tribes will require heavy subsidies to achieve
economic parity with the states. Deprived of tax shelters and
federal aid to offset reservation transactions costs and to ac-
celerate investment, tribal areas actually become poorer, as the ex-
perience of Menominee termination vividly demonstrated.21,
Decreasing tribal growth increases the states' costs of serving
tribal members. The choice is really between a temporary burden
on state revenues and a permanent one.
The Economics of State Tax Enforcement
Enforcement of Moe will decrease the attractiveness of Indian
reservations for the location of businesses, whether Indian or
non-Indian-owned."' However, the immediate adverse impact will
fall heaviest on individual Indian entrepreneurs. Until recently,
most reservation economic activity has been tribally owned and
operated due to tribes' ability to attract public funds and mobilize
capital through taxation or resource liquidation. Individual Indian
capitalism, long a goal of federal administrators who read dark
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hints of socialism into tribal ownership, is a relatively recent
phenomenon.
Reservations offer few economic advantages. Cheap and abun-
clant natural resources, where available, are of interest primarily
to large, high-capital corporate enterprises. So is cheap labor. The
only incentive for small retailing and service businesses is tax
shelter. Reservations are rarely near major population centers or
located along major arteries. Eliminate the tax shelter and small
businesses will relocate where they can secure these other ad-
vantages.
Small individual enterprises will not make or break reservation
economics. Large-scale resource exploitation is more promising.
Tribal developers wholesaling raw materials will avoid at least the
narrow effect of Moe, but if the state levies a use or excise tax on
these goods which it legally defines as borne by the purchaser,
lAtfoe could be extended to these transactions. States can take ad-
vantage of Moe by amending their tax codes to match all retail
sales taxes with redundant use taxes appropriately defined.' "
Minimizing the cost of Moe to reservation businesses will re-
quire that the responsibilities of retailers be made extremely clear.
As a matter of policy, clear assignment of duties minimizes waste
of resources in litigation and conflict . As a matter of law, citizens
have a right to be informed sufficiently to be able to avoid liabili-
ty.
Under the circumstances, burden of proof is a crucial issue. Moe
preserves the right of Indians to purchase goods tax-free, but
retailers must have a practical opportunity to take advantage of
this. The state might (1) require retailers to tax all sales and apply
for a refund from the state later, or (2) permit retailers to collect
the tax selectively and remit to the state only what they collect. In
either case, who bears the burden of proof that a particular sale
was made to an Indian7 If the burden falls on retailers, they will
tend to tax all customers indiscriminately to avoid risk of ac-
counting to the state. On the other hand, retailers' books might be
accorded a presumption of validity, leaving the state to prove
fraud or collusion. In "infringement" terms, the latter rule in-
volves less cost and risk for Indian retailers and maximizes
retailers' incentive to selectively pass on tax savings to their Indian
customers.
The aggregate effect of state retail sales taxes on reservation
economies is difficult to predict because precise data on reserva-
tion commerce is unavailable. As a suggestion, however,
Washington State's estimate of a $5.4 million annual tax loss to
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reservation sales reflects, at estimated retention rates, as much as
two million dollars in reservation income. This is about 6 per cent
of the aggregate personal incomes of all tribal members residing
on reservations within the state." Tribes themselves in
Washington report an aggregate annual revenue from business of
only a little more than $5 million.) °
Benefit/Burden Analysis
The states argue that tax-exempt Indians do not pay for the state
services they receive, resulting in a net flow of wealth from state to
reservation."' If this is true, it is nevertheless not necessarily
unlawful. Often the exercise of congressional power results in a
net transfer of wealth among states. Legitimacy is determined by
the nature and purposes of the power exercised, not its distributive
consequences. The recent increase in duties on imports of
petroleum was designed to encourage domestic production, but
had severe negative consequences on New England, and benefited
southwestern oil-producing states. Natural gas pipeline price ceil-
ings work notorious interstate redistributions of wealth in the
name of national energy policy. Every time a military installation
is closed or a major military technology contract let for national
defense purposes, interstate currents of wealth are altered, as the
more technology-dependent cities like Seattle are well aware.
If Congress has "plenary power" to provide for Indians' welfare,
it matters little as a constitutional matter whether Congress does
so by taxing the states for the support of federal welfare
bureaucrats, or legislates responsibilities to state agencies to sup-
port out of their own taxes. The states should in fact prefer to
assume these functions themselves. State administration
guarantees that state citizens will fill the staff positions, and pro-
vides some measure of local control over policy. On the other
hand, under federal administration, the cost would be spread over
all fifty states through the federal tax system, instead of falling on
about a dozen states.
Assuming for argument's sake that the net flow of wealth
between state and reservation is legally relevant, the size and even
the direction of that flow is subject to dispute. Unfortunately, no
accurate tax and expenditure figures for reservations are available
from the affected states, which is surprising in light of the bitter
accusations they have made. Quantification must take into ac-
count at least these four important, special factors: because reser-
vations are underdeveloped, most Indian consumer income is ac-
tually spent off the reservation where it is taxed by the states;
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reservation Indians do not benefit equally from all state programs;
the federal government partially reimburses the states for tax
losses due to reservations and generally pays for a major share of
most of the state services available to Indians; and tribes may
serve non-Indians.
I will use the state of Washington for illustration. Sales, use,
and motor vehicle taxes comprise about 33 per cent of the state's
r'evenue, property taxes only 5 per cent. ' Since at this time there
are few retail stores on Washington reservations, and reservation
housing is federally subsidized, nearly all of the expendable in-
come of reservation Indians must flow off-reservation. Conse-
quently they already contribute almost as much in the way of sales
and use taxes, and about 33 per cent as much in total taxes as if
they were non-Indian state citizens. Adjusting for the fact that In-
dian median income is about one-half of the state average," ' I
estimate this to be about $2.5 million.
Indians are, per capita, larger landholders than the non-Indian
residents of Washington. Approximately 5.8 per cent of the land
in Washington is held in trust, whereas reservation Indians com-
prise less than .5 per cent of the population.9 ' Along the coast of
Puget Sound, much of this land is valuable as developable
shoreline, while in the midsection of the state it has potential, if at
all, as developable agricultural and timber lands. Taking the
average tax yield per acre on a county-by-county basis to adjust
for local valuations," this 5.8 per cent of the state's land base has a
potential yield of $2.7 million.
From the state's point of view, then, property tax exemptions
are more important than exemptions on retail sales. However,
Congress has always been explicit in shielding tribal trust and
allotted lands from state taxation, even to the point of providing
for the continuation of such exemptions after the state has
assumed civil and criminal jurisdiction over the reservation.9 "' It is
much easier for the states to seek common law decisions in favor
of retail sales taxing powers than to challenge Congress' statutory
tax exemptions.
Most Washington state revenue supports programs likely to
benefit reservation Indians. Education absorbs 41 per cent of the
current budget; another 25 per cent provides social services and
health programs. 97 Smaller components, such as transportation,
may benefit tribes directly or indirectly, as state roads are fre-
quently the principal axes of travel on and near reservations.
Some programs categorically exclude reservations. Political
subdivisions and natural resources management take up about 11
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per cent of the state budget, but tribal government operations and
reservation resource management are financed by the United
States through the Bureau of Indian Affairs."' Thus, while tribal
Indians in Washington may pay only about 33 per cent of their
"full" tax share, they do not receive more than 89 per cent of state
services."a
No consideration of the state is complete without an examina-
tion of federal subsidies. In the current budget, 23 per cent of the
state's social and health programs are federally financed."°'
Assume, then, that reservation Indians in Washington receive a
proportional share of all state social and health services: $9.5
million. Of this, the state contributes 77 per cent or $7.3 million.
Paying only sales, use, and other off-reservation transactions
taxes, reservation Indians cover perhaps $2.5 million of this. If
they paid all state taxes, they would cover about $5 million. In
either case, the state appears to lose money. That might have been
anticipated. Being underdeveloped, reservations have relatively
low per capita tax bases."'
Special federal grants for Indians must also be considered,
however, before a conclusion is made as to net flow of funds. As
seen in the case of Montana, these programs involve a much
higher federal contribution to the cost of serving Indians than non-
Indians in the same state. If we assume that impact aid, Johnson-
O'Malley, and other Indian education funds compensate
Washington for the full per pupil cost of educating reservation In-
dian children, the cost of the remaining social and health services
provided by the state to Washington reservations is only about $4
million.
Nor is it clear that the state collects only sales and related taxes
from reservations. Non-Indian leaseholds, for example, are taxed
and the proceeds reported as realty tax revenue. There is also the
issue of tribal services delivered to non-Indian reservation
residents. Some Washington reservations are encouraging residen-
tial subdivisions, which bring in hundreds of tax-paying non-
Indians and demand expansion of tribal services. The extent to
which these factors offset state contributions is not known.
Even if the state does subsidize reservation Indians to the extent
of $1.5 million or more annually, federal grants and contracts
made directly to tribes, and Indian-related federal payroll within
the state, total at least $10 million."2 Most of this pays for personal
services, so it will recirculate through the state economy as
disposable income. This added wealth greatly exceeds the most
liberal estimate of the state's net subsidy to tribes, and the state en-
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joys it only because it surrounds reservations. The state's tax yield
alone on this windfall probably exceeds the apparent net state sub-
sidy to reservation residents.
There is no requirement that all non-Indian state residents pay
their own way. All taxation redistributes income, especially taxa-
tion for education and social services. Making the poor pay their
own way defeats the very purpose of the tax. If we suppose for the
moment, however, that states are entitled to recoup some or all of
their expenditures on reservations, is taxation the appropriate
remedy? All that Moe does is authorize states to tax more. How
much more each state will realize depends entirely on its tax struc-
ture and the distribution of wealth on its reservations.
The same size tax can be raised a number of ways. Each way
may have different "incidents" of effects on behavior and the
distribution of wealth. Every tax is therefore the product of the
marriage of two kinds of policy: revenue and regulation. If the
states' only interest in taxing reservation activities is revenue,
allowing them to tax accords them more power than they need.
The way they collect the tax may offset or frustrate tribal regula-
tion of social and economic behavior.
The states' revenue interest and tribes' regulatory interest could
be reconciled by a system of requisition. The state determines how
it will be raised. Better information about actual state service ex-
penditures for tribes would be needed, but bringing such informa-
tion out in the open would provide a basis for regulating the cost
and quality of programs. 3 Adjusted for the impact of reservation
income on state welfare, requisition formulas may well argue for
the reduction or elimination of many pre-Moe state taxes on reser-
vations, L e., by showing the state on the debit side.
It is a fiction that reservations alone provide a unique op-
portunity for state citizens to "get away with" avoiding state
taxes. State citizens avoid state taxes in many other ways that are
entirely lawful and completely beyond the power of the states to
control. If the states "should" have the power to stop the tax drain
to reservations, then, a fortiori, they "should" have power to stop
the tax drain to neighboring states.
Washington State's cigarette tax stamps cost 16 cents. Oregon's
rate has always been lower; it is currently 9 cents."° "As a result,
purchase of cigarettes by Washingtonians in Oregon boom[s] in
the border counties.""° At times the difference in price between a
carton of cigarettes purchased in Oregon and one purchased in
Washington has been as high as $1.20, compared with about $1.85
for Indian cigarettes. However, the State Department of Revenue
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does not publicize annual tax losses to Oregon, nor attempt to in-
tercept and tax cigarettes bound for Oregon retailers. The import-




In 1948 Congress considered a measure to minimize the
redistributive effect of interstate cigarette tax differentials that
would have penalized failure to report to the Secretary of the
Treasury deliveries of cigarettes in interstate commerce to untaxed
distributors." Citizens of states that taxed both the sale and use of
cigarettes' were already subject to state prosecution for receiving
mail order shipments of untaxed cigarettes from nontaxing states
and not paying the use tax on them. The proposed law did not,
therefore, modify the constitutional taxing power of the states. It
merely provided them with the information needed to locate and
identify violators of extant state revenue laws.' This is different
from the controversy over Indian reservations, where the state's
power to tax at all is in question.
Perhaps off-reservation businesses are the real stimulus behind
the reservation taxation issue. '1 They would have just as much
reason to complain about tribes' power to subsidize their
businesses, tribal ownership of businesses, and special federal pro-
grams designed to accelerate reservation growth. All of these
things, as well as tax immunity, give Indian businesses a com-
petitive advantage. The Constitution does not require that
businesses be subject to the same regulation everywhere. In the tax
issue, however, off-reservation businesses find a powerful ally
with a common interest-the states. The ambiguity of the law
gave the challenge an opportunity for success.
Why Territoriality?
Chief Justice John Marshall observed that "the power of taxa-
tion is not confined to the people or property of a state [but] may
be exercised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction,"
and "to the utmost extent to which the government may choose to
carry it.....
That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that
it is retained by the states; that it is not abridged by a grant of
a similar power to the government of the Union; that it is to
be concurrently exercised by the two governments are truths
which have never been denied."'
So much is admitted, but this concurrency of state and federal
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taxation has proved a rich source of controversy from John Mar-
shall's time to the present. Taxation is like any other form of
regulation and can modify the behavior of its objects.3 As the ear-
ly records of the Supreme Court demonstrate, the welling-up of
political tensions that would ultimately result in civil war was
often expressed in tax conflicts.'
Concurrency poses numerous problems. One government may
tax an industry to decelerate its growth and raise defense funds;
the other, exempt it from taxation to accelerate growth and
employment, but tax its employees' wage for school expenses.
Unless there is some clear rule according supremacy to one or the
other, the policy and revenue consequences of the two taxes will
depend entirely upon the accident of who taxes first or taxes
nearest to the ultimate source of the taxable property. Neither
government can achieve reasonably stable expectations. Attempts
by either to protect its policy from the other lead to retaliatory
taxes. This is precisely the kind of disharmony the framers of the
Constitution sought to avoid.
Establishing the supremacy of one government's laws does not
necessarily eliminate the concurrency problem. The Federalist
never succeeded in answering the argument that the United States,
by use of the supremacy clause, could tax the states out of
existence." 5 At first, the Supreme Court also militantly defended
federal activities from state taxation. "Questions of power do not
depend on the degree to which it may be exercised," John Marshall
wrote in 1827."6 The Court cannot accept a state's assurances that
its taxes are harmless and will never be abused. "[Is this a case of
confidence? Would the people of any one state trust those of
another with a power to control the most insignificant operations
of their state government? We know they would not."3'
At some point the power of the United States to immunize pro-
perty from taxation must nevertheless cease. "No doubtevery tax
upon personal property or upon corporations, business or fran-
chises, affects more or less the subjects and operations of com-
merce. Yet it is not everything that affects commerce that amounts
to a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution." '
Fixing upon a meaningful rule was the problem.
The power [of states to tax], and the restriction on it,
though quite distinguishable when they do not approach
each other, may yet, like the intervening colors between
white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex the
understanding, as colors perplex the vision in making the
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distinction between them. Yet the distinction exists, and must
be marked as the cases arise. Till they do arise, it might be
premature to state any rule as being universal in its
application.""
Only through adoption of unambiguous standards are "we re-
lieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from in-
terfering powers; from a repugnancy between a right in one
government to pull down what there is an acknowledged right in
another to build up. ''3'0
The Marshall Court proposed to divide federal and state tax
authority at the point where property "becomes incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property" of the state.2 States respond-
ed by taxing the receivers rather than the carriers of goods; the
Court reacted by tracing the economic burden back to the goods.3
More recently the Court has been distinguishing between goods
"at rest" and goods in "a continuous route or journey. ' M The men-
tal gymnastics required in applying these phrases to individual
cases are exemplified by the Court's conclusion that gasoline in a
tank at an airport prior to being loaded onto a plane is taxable by
the state, but gasoline in the plane's tanks when it lands and
"rests" at the airport is not.2
The Court's attempts to deal with the federal-state boundary are
noneconomic, but pseudo-economic. They purport to disentangle
interstate and intra-state commerce, an impossible task. Any solu-
tion must be arbitrary. We may choose among arbitrary solutions
on the basis of relative clarity, an administrative efficiency
criterion, or relative effect on the distribution of revenue between
the United States and the individual states, a function of power.
Or we may agree on the rule that minimizes intergovernmental
disputes. There is no "right" rule. Historical fluctuations in the in-
terpretation of ambiguities such as "mingling with the mass of pro-
perty" of the state probably tend to reflect shifts in the Court's
federalist politics rather than the evolution of a "better" boundary
line.
The purpose of this discussion is to make a relatively simple but
important point. Even where concurrent jurisdiction is required
by the Constitution, it invites perpetual conflict and defies neat
resolution. As a matter of political policy, it should be avoided
whenever there exists a legitimate alternative.
Subject only to federal immunities, a state may "tax at its discre-
tion its own internal commerce, and the franchises, property or
business of its own corporations."'' The operative limitation is the
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territory of the state. Territory is a superior rule for resolving con-
flicts among political subdivisions because it is relatively clear,
precise, and objectively ascertainable. It is not subject to judicial
construction. Problems arise when legislatures choose as taxable
incidents events incapable of accurate location in time or space.
It is inevitable in a system of territorial jurisdiction that some
states will profit and others lose from the interstate movement of
goods. Differentials in state law affect the net interstate flow of
wealth. Congress evens out many of these redistributions indirect-
ly when it subsidizes state programs out of national taxes. Concur-
:rent jurisdiction cannot eliminate redistribution; it can only add
uncertainty to the picture.
Refusal to pay taxes is a serious matter. The uncertainty remain-
ing after Moe threatens those who test states' assertions of taxing
power with criminal liability. In a zone of uncertainty private per-
sons are unlikely to seek to vindicate what they believe are their
rights. One reason for a more vigorous application of vagueness
standards where criminal penalties are involved is the likelihood
that government will act unopposed in areas of uncertainty, not
because it has the right, but because the risks involved in testing its
actions are too severe.
The individual citizen is thrust into a hopeless dilemma, caught
between the assertions of two governments that they may tax or
otherwise regulate him. Obedience to both may be economically
or physically impossible; yet disobedience to either subjects him to
litigation and potential harm. It is particularly incumbent upon
thee courts in such cases to follow the tradition of territorial
jurisdiction among political subdivisions rather than invent new
and uncertain rules. 26
Conclusion: Moe and the Legal Profession
Indian tribes have acquired a costly habit of relying on federal
litigation to resolve fundamental political controversies with the
states. State interests are not "represented" in the courts as they
are in Congress, and from Williams to McClanahan tribes were
,encouraged to believe that they had won significant victories in
limiting state power and establishing their own authority. The
tribes' illusion of growing security was fed by a consistent failure
to recognize the unprincipled and erratic nature of the favorable
rulings.
As argued elsewhere, judges and lawyers share an education
that excludes mature consideration of tribal government.32' Few
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law textbooks in general use accord Indian law serious treatment.
Ignorance is a powerful helpmate of confusion. In an appeal in
which the advocates and judges have only briefly investigated an
unfamiliar topic, we can expect what is in fact in evidence in the
Supreme Court record: abused precedents, citations to inconsis-
tent chains of precedent, essential cases and statutes overlooked,
significant social and economic facts disregarded. Litigation feeds
on uncertainty, and lawyers profit from litigation. Accordingly,
lawyers in the Indian business have an interest in perpetuating
uncertainty. In common with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, their
usefulness will not outlast the problem it is their task to eliminate.
Ethics and self-interest motivate short-sightedness in the legal
profession. If a client insists upon fighting for a short-term gain,
his attorney is not in an enviable position. Counseling against
litigation in favor of working for deferred payoffs may be
unethical because it is not what the client wants. It may also entail
deferring the lawyer's own rewards. Whether idealistic or
motivated by gain, the advocate may find it difficult to zealously
counsel long-range planning.
Legislation is a preferable strategy for achieving clarity in In-
dian law. A statute is less ambiguous, attracts more notoriety, can
be comprehensive, and in the long run may be cheaper to obtain.
Judgment is limited to the specific facts of the case. It can only sug-
gest the consequences of litigating similar facts in the future,
assuming the court cooperates and provides us with a reasonably
visible, concrete rule. To flesh out any rule requires several in-
dependent presentations. With careful coordination among
litigants in related cases, consolidation of the rule consumes years
of effort. Without it, rules become fraught with exceptions, con-
tradictions, fluctuations, and involution. Because a lawyer's
ethical duty is to his own client, coordination, which necessarily
involves some limitations on each litigant's options, is strictly
speaking a breach of ethics by the attorneys. Moreover, for the
ascertainment of economic and social reality, courts must rely on
the presentations of the parties' lawyers in the particular case. If a
fact is conceded or presented erroneously by one advocate and not
challenged upon by the other, the court has little choice but to
assume it to be true.
A definitive statutory solution to the tribal jurisdiction con-
troversy is now a necessity. Even if tribes are unable to achieve
perfect territorial sovereignty, they will gain in certainty and en-
forceability over the current state of affairs. They will be able to
divert their scarce resources from defending, and periodically
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struggling to extend their powers along an indefinite boundary
line, to the important task of domestic growth and social welfare.
Unfortunately, I suspect that Congress itself would resist a com-
prehensive measure. Moe is a reasonably satisfactory compromise
to problems that have pervaded the past generation of Indian
policy. States are reluctant to invest in Indian services, or assume
any power or responsibility over reservations without taxing
power or federal subsidies. This reluctance may have done more
to defeat the termination policy in the 1950's than tribal protest.
At the same time, the Bureau is reluctant to give up any of its
power over the reservation activities that justify its existence. Both
the states and the Bureau would be happiest in a world in which
the states tax and the Bureau serves. That is, in large part, what
Moe has brought about. Congress is confronted with a desirable
fait accompli and can disclaim any responsibility for it to the In-
dian community. There is little incentive to change it.
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Minn. 42 (1917). Cf. United States v. Osborn, 2 F. 58 (D. Ore. 1880). The Supreme Court
eventually resisted this tendency, e.g., United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), but the
use of severance of tribal relationship as a legal criterion has never entirely disappeared,
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 209 (1973).
96. 411 U.S. 164, 170 (1973).
97. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). At one point Marshall characterized tribes as "once
independent and sovereign nations," Id. (emphasis added), and elsewhere as
"semi-independent," id. at 173 (emphasis added). Thurgood Marshall obviously shared
John Marshall's problems with labeling tribes' political status. See Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831).
98. 411 U.S. 164,172 n.8 (1973).
99. 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
100. 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973).
101. Id.at 179.
102. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
103. Marshall cited only one case for this sweeping generalization: Kake v. Egan, 369
U.S. 60 (1962), which at the beginning of his opinion, id. at 179, he said was inapplicable
to the Navajos.
104. Marshall may have been thinking of conflicts of laws, where "interest tests"
abound. In conflicts, however, although the discovery of another state's interest in a con-
troversy may result in application of that state's substantive law, it does not ordinarily re-
quire a change in the forum.
105. 411 U.S. 145 (1973), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 83 N.M. 158, 489 P.2d 666
(1971).
106. 25 U.S.C. 465 (1975).
107. 25 U.S.C. 567 (1970).
108. 411 U.S. 146, 155 n.11 (1973). This was also true in Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60
(1962).
109. 411 U.S. 146, 148 (1973).
110. Id. at 150. Where, then, does Warren fit in? In support of this generalization, id.
at 154-55, White quoted at length from Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575,
578-81 (1928). Shaw actually based its conclusion that leaseholds in off-reservation trust
lands are taxable on the theory that to "hold them immune would be inconsistent with one
of the very purposes of their creation, to educate Indians in responsibility." In other words,
although tax immunity may encourage Indian economic development, nonimmunity serves
a higher purpose of teaching Indians their civic duty as taxpaying citizens! Shaw was
therefore very much an instrumentality case, however unorthodox its interpretation of the
nature of the federal purpose.
111. 411 U.S. 145, 150 (1973); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 168
(1973).
112. 411 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1973).
113. Id. at 151, citing Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. v. Mackey, 256 U.S. 531, 536
(1921).
114. 283 U.S. 279, 282 (1931). The same rule has been applied to state taxes on sales of
property by the United States, United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469, 472
(1958).
115. The original case on this principle was, of course, McCulloch v. Maryland, 18
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), which involved state taxation of federal bank notes. State taxa-
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tion of the use of a federal subsidy must frustrate federal policy just as much as state taxa-
tion of federal currency, although the latter has a more general or diffuse effect. The Court
now takes the position that an activity, to be exempt, must be "virtually ... an arm of the
Government," Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1966).
See also United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964) (contractor's use of federal property sub-
ject to state tax).
116. 411 U.S. 154 (1973). Recall Frankfurter's contrary argument in Metlakatla.
117. See, e.g., Hearing, To Grant Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom
to Organize for Purposes of Local Self-Government and Economic Enterprise, Senate
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong.. 2d Sess. (1934), at 31-32, 64, 70, 106, 151; Hearing,
Readjustment of Indian Affairs, House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934), at 18, 20, 22, 23, 43, 48, 316; 78 CONG. REC. 11729 (June 15, 1934).
118. 25 C.F.R. subchapters K through Q. In addition, subchapters B, F, and G
regulate tribal governing functions and subchapters H through J regulate tribal fiscal
management.
119. Id., subchapter W ("Miscellaneous"), subparts 251-52.
120. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972), affig 335 F. Supp. 1258 (N.M.
1971).
121. Kake had attached no significance whatsoever to the fact that the tribal activities
there were conducted on sites acquired from the same agency, the United States Forest Ser-
vice!
122. 25 U.S.C. 465 (1970).
123. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Cohn v.
Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
124. Chouteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931). The non-Indian lessee of trust land is
also taxable by the state, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949), with
the result that the Indian lessor's income is indirectly taxed. These cases only superficially
suggest a jurisdictional distinction based on race. The lessees were residents of the taxing
state, not the reservation. By the rule of Alpha Portland Cement a state resident can be tax-
ed by his own state on the proceeds of out-of-state land.
125. Leahy v. State Treasurer, 297 U.S. 420 (1936).
126. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956). See also Holt v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d
33 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 931 (1967) (Sioux Indians' income from cattle
grazed on tribal trust land subject to federal income tax) ; Superintendent of Five Civilized
Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935) (income from reinvestment of tribal trust
funds taxable by United States). I.R.S. REV. RUL. 67-284 provides that proceeds of trust land
are tax exempt only if "directly" derived from the land itself.
127. In addition, because the United States pays for most reservation services, it can
advance the stronger claim for indemnification through taxes.
128. 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 21, 38-39,
55, 64, 77 (1845).
129. The majority and dissent both agreed that Congress intended to foster tribal
economic enterprise. The real issue was the extent to which tax immunities were implied in
this general policy.
130. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
131. Justice White included fixtures within the statutory tax exemption because they
are "so intimately connected with the use of the land itself," 411 U.S. 145, 158 (1973). No
cases, state or federal, were cited on this point.
132. Id. at 161.
133. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S: 535 (1938); Perrin v. United States, 232
U.S. 478 (1914). Neither case is strictly in point for this sweeping principle. McGowan in-
volved liquor sales within an executive-order reservation. In Perrin the tribe had stipulated
in its treaty of cession that no liquor be sold within the ceded tract. Thus, in both cases, the
particular situs remained under some degree of special residual, territorial federal control.
134. 411 U.S. 145, 155 (1973).
135. Id. at 162.
136. Hearing, Emancipated Citizenship for Indians, House Comm. on Indian Affairs,
71st Cong., 3d Sess. 17 (1931).
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137. 419 U.S. 544 (1975), rev'g 487 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1973).
138. Id. at 546-50, 487 F.2d at 15-17.
139. 18 U.S.C. 1151, 1154(a),(c), 1161 (1970).
140. 487 F.2d 17-18 (10th Cir. 1973). Assignment of the burden of proof on this issue
was hopelessly confused at trial. 419 U.S. 544, 549 n.8, 553 n.10 (1975) rev'g 487 F.2d 14
(10th Cir. 1973).
141. 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
142. 487 F.2d 14, 18 (10th Cir. 1973).
143. The court buried this conclusion in an aside as if it were embarrassed by its own
bootstrapping: "if the Government has the power to regulate a business on the land it
granted in fee without restrictions, which we doubt .... "(emphasis mine). The lower court
was transfixed on the idea that the Mazuries' original fee patent did not include language
reserving jurisdiction to the tribe. But patents do not contain language reserving jurisdic-
tion to states, either, and yet are subject to state law. The real question is who has jurisdic-
tion of the place, not what the patent says.
144. Congress adopted a kind of demographic test of tribal jurisdiction in the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1610(b)(2)(B) (1970). As currently administered,
the reservation system forces educated and skilled Indians to choose between unemploy-
ment and self-government on their own land, or self-imposed but more profitable exile in
urban areas.
145. 419 U.S. 544, 553 (1975).
146. 487 F.2d 14, 18 (10th Cir. 1973).
147. Id. at 19, citing McClanahan and Mescalero, which is difficult to understand.
The court also cited Iron Crow for authority that tribal powers extend only to tribal
members, as in a private association, but disregarded Barta, in which the same circuit
recognized the same tribe's power to tax non-Indians. Supra note 26. The district court did
admit that "certain tribes" have attributes of sovereignty. Astoundingly, the Wind River
tribes did not submit an amicus brief to the Supreme Court to challenge these remarkable
theories.
148. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Tenth Circuit did not cite these cases. See also
United States v. Rock Royal Coop, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
149. 419 U.S. 544, 553-56 (1975). There is no contrary Supreme Court authority.
150. Id. at 699, citing United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319-22 (1936), which is not in point. Curtiss-Wright questioned the power of Congress to
delegate foreign trade authority to the President, not to a state or local government or
private body. If Rehnquist was assuming that tribes are, like the President, parts of the
federal government itself, he ignored the contrary ruling of Mescalero.
151. Id. at 557, citing Williams and McClanahan. Many tribes have licensing powers
enumerated in their constitutions. In a sample of 64 North Plains, Northwestern, and Basin
tribes' constitutions, I found 31 that had such provisions.
152. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
153. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973), decided shortly after McClanahan.
The power of Congress to terminate tribes without their consent has never been denied by
the courts, although the scope of a particular termination act may be challenged.
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). See also United States v. Celestine,
215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909): "[Wjhen Congress has once established a reservation, all tracts in-
cluded within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress."
154. For evidence of the tribe's willingness to part with its territory, the Court relied
largely on statements of tribal members recorded by negotiators for the United States, 420
U.S. 425, 436 n.16 (1975), and reported in the Minneapolis Tribune, id. at 435
n.12-scarcely unbiased sources. The Court had evidence before it that the tribe was in a
desperate state economically, which their "guardian," the United States, had failed to
relieve. Rather than ask Congress for funds, the Interior Department, under pressure from
non-Indian businessmen, persuaded the tribe to sell its reservation to finance essential ser-
vices. Id. at 431 n.8. The tribes obviously had little choice in the matter. Approximately 72
per cent of the reservation was sold, the balance being allotted to individual tribal
members. Id. at 436 n.16, 438 n.19.
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155. Id. at 444-46. Remember that Stewart joined Douglas in chiding the majority in
McClanahan for not applying the Carpenter rule to the facts there. The facts in DeCouteau
must have struck Stewart as requiring too extreme an application of the principle of "liberal
construction."
156. Id. at 449.
157. In his dissent, Douglas matched the majority's legislative history with reasonably
persuasive evidence cutting the other way, i.e., that Congress intended the sale to have no
effect on tribal self-government. Id. at 461-64, n.2.
158. The tribe also provided services and maintained a system of courts and laws. Its
1964 constitution invoked jurisdiction over only "Indian-owned lands," a provision found
in about one-fourth of all current tribal constitutions. In 1966 the Secretary of the Interior
approved a new constitution conferring complete territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 443, 464-65,
n.8. All but two of the other eleven tribes administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs'
Aberdeen Area Office already had such provisions. 1 & 2 Fay, Charters, Constitutions and
By-Laws of Indian Tribes of North America, COLORADO STATE COLLEGE MUSEUM OF
ANTHROPOLOGY, OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1967).
159. 420 U.S. 425. 464 (1975), citing Williams and McClanahan, neither of which,
however, actually include comparable language.
160. Id. at 456 (Article I).
161. Id. at 464-65 Cf. the majority's discussion at 445, n.33.
162. Quoted and discussed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Foster, and in Elam v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 300 (1829) (emphasis added).
163. E.g., 39 Stat. 988 (1917), and 42 Stat. 576 (1921), as well as annual appropria-
tions for the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
164. 420 U.S. 425, 466-67 (1975).
165. My computation, based on the original area of the Lake Traverse Reservation. If
all allotments had been made contiguous, the residual tribal perimeter would have been on-
ly about 57 miles.
166. See § 2(a)(2) of the Act, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975), 25 U.S.C. 450 (1975).
167. -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 943 (1976).
168. Id., 96 S.Ct. at 946-47. Northern Cheyenne is not a Public Law 280 reservation.
169. Id. at 946. Fisher therefore implicitly overrules Draper. But Fisher relies on
Kake, which itself purported to rely on Draperl The conclusion is the converse of one of
the premises.
170. Montana had acquired this jurisdiction, of course, via Draper, which was ap-
provingly cited by the Court in Williams, Kake, and McClanahan.
171. The power of tribes to tax non-Indians was upheld in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Bar-
ta, 146 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. 1956); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905). Whether this
power is concurrent or exclusive was not resolved.
172. -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 943,948 (1976).
173. 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974). Morton reasoned that the Indian preference rule
governing Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring is not racial but political in nature; since the
Bureau governs Indians, the Court reasoned, requiring employees to be Indians wherever
possible is like a residency requirement for state office.
174. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103,110 (1932).
175. Commissioner v. Hausen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959); Commissioner v. Court Holding,
324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Cubic Corp. v. United
States, 74-2 T.C. 9967 (S.D. Cal. 1974). Similarly, the "economic interest" test for
distinguishing between leases and sales for federal tax purposes, Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S.
551 (1933); Vest v. C.I.R., 481 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1973); Wood v. United States, 377 F.2d
300 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Resorts Int'l v. C.1.R., 511 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1975) (sale versus
license, "proprietary right" rule). Cf. Central Oil & Supply Corp. v. United States, 75-1
T.C. 16184 (W.D. La. 1975) (sale versus consignment, referred to state law).
176. 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (1975), quoting from R.C.M. 84-5606 (1). The court
referred to this statute as the "factual background" of the case.
177. Mary Ellen McCaffree, "Who Must Pay to Puff?" Address to the Western States
Association of Tax Administrators, Sept. 23, 1975 (Offprint by State of Washington,
Department of Revenue).
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178. Retention will therefore be a function of the remoteness of reservations from
populated areas. The more costly it is for consumers to patronize a reservation retailer, the
less they will be willing to pay for the same goods. I would predict a lower retention in
Montana, for instance, than on the western Washington reservations ringing Seattle.
179. 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (1975).
180. Id. at 1311. The applicability of state cigarette sales taxes to Indian consumers
was never seriously disputed. Montana assumed criminal and limited civil jurisdiction
under Pub. L. 280, but the district court concluded that taxation is neither criminal in
nature nor implied in Montana's Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction over schools, public welfare,
domestic relations, mental health, or traffic. Id. at 1306, 1317. In other words, the power to
tax is not implied in the power to serve. Compare Tonasket v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 164, 525
P.2d 744 (1974), which relied on, of all things Kake and Draper to reach the opposite rule.
See also Mahoney v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 96 Idaho 59, 524 P.2d 187, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1089 (1974).
181. See Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (C.A. Ariz. 1971). The currently ap-
plicable statutes are 25 U.S.C. 261-62 (1970).
182. See especially the Indian Financing Act, Pub. L. 93262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974), 25
U.S.C. 1451-1553 (1974 Supp.); § 10 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 986 (1934),
asamended25 U.S.C. 470 (1970).
183. 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (1975) (emphasis added). This notion is repeated in
substance at 1317.
184. Id. at 1311, 1317.
185. Id. at 1314 n.9, 1314-15.
186. 20 U.S.C. 236 et seq., 631 et seq. (1958). Commonly referred to as "Public Law
874," it provides state districts with 100 per cent of the federally estimated "per pupil cost"
of children whose parents live and work on a federal reservation.
187. 25 U.S.C. 452 (1970).
188. 20 U.S.C. 241a; 20 U.S.C. 241aa-241ff (1970).
189. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND. AN EVEN CHANCE: A REPORT ON FEDERAL
FUNDS FOR INDIAN CHILDREN IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1971).
190. LEVITAN & JOHNSON, INDIAN GIVING. FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 41
(1975). This study was commissioned by the Ford Foundation.
191. Id. Montana attributed $356,735 to "impact" aid for Flathead, 392 F. Supp. 1297,
1314 (1975), but receives $1.1 million statewide from Johnson-O'Malley alone. Hearing,
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Fiscal Year 1976, Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 892-93 (1975). This works out to $186 per
Indian pupil or about $105,000 for Flathead.
192. The district court seemed aware of this, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1314 n.9 (1975).
193. E.g., Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 756, S16 (Crow).
194. 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 n.2 (1975). This is unusually high. Fort Peck is com-
parable with 65 per cent, but the other five Montana reservations are probably less than 10
per cent non-Indian residents. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL AND
STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1971).
195. 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (1975).
196. Id. at 1314.
197. Id. at 1315-16.
198. Id. at 1319, 1323-24.
199. Implying, of course, that it involves a "compelling" national interest. Id. at 1315-
16, 1321. Similarly, Fisher v. District Ct.,-U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 943, 948 (1976); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974).
200. 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1319-20 (1975).
201. From time to time, state representatives have gone on record to support this alter-
native, e.g., Hearing, Readjustment of Indian Affairs, supra note 17, at 173-75.
202. -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1639-42, (1976).
203. This issue was not raised in McClanahan.
204. 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (1975), quoting from Department of Employment v.
United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966) (emphasis added).
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205. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); United States v. Rickert, 188
U.S. 432 (1903).
206. -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1641-42 (1976). The Report merely said that § 1362
would provide "the means whereby the tribes are assured of the same judicial determina-
tion whether the action is brought in their behalf by the Government or by their own at-
tornies."
207. Id. at 1640.
208. Id. at 1641 n.13.
209. Id. at 1640-41, especially n.13. Cf. Cady v. Morton 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975)
and Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972), holding that a tribe is a federal in-
strumentality for the purposes of applying the National Environmental Protection Act.
210. -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1642-43 (1976).
211. Consistent with Mazurie, however, Rehnquist rejected the state's contention that
allotment of the reservation had the effect of checkerboarding tribal jurisdiction. Id. at
1643-44, citing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 491 (1973), United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544, 554-55 (1975), and Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) ("im-
practical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction" contrary to federal purpose in creating reser-
vations). Similarly, the district court in Moe declined to extend DeCouteau to the Flathead
situation.
212. -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1645 (1976), where he says the fact that the burden falls
on the consumer "necessarily follows" for the wording of the statute. Four years earlier the
Court held that a Connecticut sales tax is borne entirely by purchasers, relying entirely on
the fact that Connecticut law required stores to ring the tax up separately. Sullivan v.
United States, 395 U.S. 169, 171 (1969). Cigarette taxes are included in the shelf price of the
goods. Is the Sullivan rule reconcilable with Moe?
213. -U.S.- 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1645 (1976) (emphasis is the Court's).
214. See also Kennerly v. District Ct., 400 U.S. 423 (1971); State ex rel. Merrill v.
Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969); Blackwolf v. District Ct., 493 P.2d 1293 (Mont. 1972);
Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 487 P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1971).
215. -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1646 (1976).
216. 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (1975). The Supreme Court declined to rule on this mat-
ter. -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 1638-39 n.6 (1976).
217. E.g., Reder, Citizen's Rights and the Cost of Law Enforcement, 3 J. op LEGAL
STUDIES 435 (1974).
218. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), app. dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906);
Maxey v. Wright, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Barta, 146 F. Supp.
917 (S.D. 1956)
219. See, e.g. Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976).
220. Act of June 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 644 asamended4 U.S.C. 104-10 (1970).
221. 4 U.S.C. 104 (1970).
222. 4 U.S.C. 105 (1973, Supp. III).
223. 4 U.S.C. 106 (1970).
224. 4 U.S.C. 107 (1970).
225. 4 U.S.C. 109 (1970).
226. 4 U.S.C. 110(e) (1970). Mysteriously, 4 U.S.C. 104 refers to "military or other
reservations," nowhere defined, rather than "Federal Area," which is defined.
227. § 7, 48 Stat. 986 (1934), 25 U.S.C. 467 (1970); also the first paragraph of § 5, 25
U.S.C. 465. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) (reservations "set apart
within the state for the residence of the tribe").
228. The only general provision for taking title in trust for tribes is 25 U.S.C. 465
(1970), but there are numerous references in acts passed for individual tribes, 25 U.S.C.
465a, 488, 489, 501, 574, 608a, 621-22, 624(d), 640d-9 (1970).
229. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Chippewa Indians v. United
States, 301 U.S. 358 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
230. 25 U.S.C. 397 (1970), lands "bought and paid for" by Indians. See Strawberry
Valley Cattle Co. v. Chipman, 13 Utah 454, 45 P. 348 (1896).
231. Art. I § 8 cl. 17.
232. Art. IV § 3 cl. 2.
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233. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558 -59 (1832). See also United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 551 (1975), and cases cited in note 2, supra.
234. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). But cf. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 113 (1962).
235. The Buck Act presumably excludes the territories and insular possessions because
its application is to Federal Areas "within" states.
236. Pub. L. 85-159, 71 Stat. 401 (1957).
237. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,110 (1962).
238. 4 Stat. 115 (1825), asamended18 U.S.C. 7 and 13 (1970).
239. James Buchanan, quoted in Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 720-21
(1946).
240. 42 CONG. REC. 1193-94 (Jan. 28, 1908). Lower federal courts twice held the Act in-
applicable to Indian reservations. United States v. King, 81 F. 625 (D.C. Wis. 1897); United
States v. Barnaby, 51 F. 20 (C.C. Mont. 1892). Both involved crimes committed by and
against Indians and, interestingly, both courts said that extension of the Act to such cases
would infringe upon tribal self-government. In 1946, the Supreme Court went the other
way in the case of a non-Indian defendant and stipulated that Indian reservations are set
aside "for the exclusive use of the United States." Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711,
713 (1946), followed without discussion in United States v. Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873, 874 (7th
Cir. 1950). The issue still seems open. Special federal criminal jurisdiction over reservation
Indians is provided by 18 U.S.C. 1152, which incorporates all "general" federal criminal
laws and post-dates the Assimilative Crimes Act, 4 Stat. 773 c.161 § 25 (1834), but whether
the Assimilative Crimes Act is a "general" criminal law is unclear.
241. Hearing, Application of State Sales and Use Taxes to Transactions in Federal
Areas, Senate Comm. on Finance, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
242. Id. at 2, 11-12, 18-19.
243. Id. at 2,18-19, 37; 84 CONG. REC. 10907 (Aug. 3,1939).
244. Hearing, supra note 241, at 18. The governor of New Mexico told Senator Buck
that the LaFollette amendment, by comparison, "practically nullifies the purpose of your
bill insofar as New Mexico is concerned." Id. at 2, 6.
245. Id. at 38-39; 84 CONG. REc. 10685 (Aug. 2, 1939).
246. Hearing, supra note 241, at 12.
247. Id. at 18-19, 22.
248. Id. at 23-37, 47.
249. Id. at 6, 13, 29, 35.
250. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942), adopted this view between the
time of these hearings and the eventual passage of the Buck Act in 1947. Cf. Collins v.
Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528-29, 530, 534-36 (1938); Surplus Trading Co. v.
Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930). In Collins, the state reserved its power of taxation when it ced-
ed the park land to the United States.
251. Similarly, military property leased to a private contractor loses its tax-exempt
status. United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
252. 380 U.S. 690 n.18 (1964).
253. 411 U.S. 176, 177 (1973).
254. In fact, some supporters were concerned lest the Buck Act imply the existence of
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